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The primary intent of this research effort is to provide an identification and
analysis of impediments to the acquisition of spare parts. The focus of the
research was in the area of Army rotary wing aviation spare parts. The
researcher delved into both pre-nonavailability and post nonavailability issues
and sought to establish responsibility for their resolution. It looked at such
factors as those general factors shaping the procurement environment, and
information gathered through archival research, interviews, questionnaires and
selected component case analysis. It was apparent from the research that a
myriad of causes of spares nonavailability exist. Some of these are controllable
and some are outside the realm of reasonable control by those in the
acquisition community. It also discussed the aggressive, iterative use of risk
management to apply limited resources to those areas with demand the most






A. FOCUS OF THE STUDY 1
B. OBJECTIVES 1
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2
E. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 3
F. LIMITATIONS 4
G. ASSUMPTIONS 4
H. DEFINITIONS / ACRONYMS 5
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 5
II. BACKGROUND 7
A. INTRODUCTION 7
B. SPARE PARTS PROCUREMENT PROCESS 8
C. FACTORS SHAPING THE PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT 11
1. Impact of the requirement for competition 1
1
2. Impact of best value contracting 12
3. Impact of modernization initiatives 14
4. Impact of the declining defense base 1 6
5. Impact of the military force drawdown 22
D. SUMMARY 23
IV
III. A PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 25
A. INTRODUCTION 25
B. RESEARCH METHODS 25
1. Archival research 26
2. Interviews 29
3. Questionnaire 30
C. COMPONENT CASE ANALYSIS 31
1. Main Rotor Yoke 33
2. Main Rotor Grip 35
3. Tension Torsion Strap 36
4. Universal Control Lever 38
5. Straight Headless Pin 40
D. CURRENT DOD SPARE PARTS PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS 41
1. Background 42
2. Typical Life Cycle 43
3. Procurement Methods 44
a. Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production 44
b. Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts 47
4. Assessment 50
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF NONAVAILABLE COMPONENTS 50
1. Technical Complexity 51
2. Lack of design stability 52
3. Lack of interoperability and commonality 52
4. Long lead-times 53
5. Finite life criteria 54
6. Time in the inventory/level of technology 55
F. TOTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 56
G. SUMMARY 58
IV. SPARES IMPEDIMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 60
A. SPARES IMPEDIMENTS 60
1. Pre-nonavailability Impediments 60
2. Post Nonavailability Impediments 68
B. ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 76
1. Pre-nonavailability actions 77
2. Post nonavailability actions 80
C. SUMMARY 82
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 83
A. CONCLUSIONS 83
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 86
C. SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 88
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 91
APPENDIX A -QUESTIONNAIRE 93
APPENDIX B - ACRONYMS 100
APPENDIX C - SPRINT INITIATIVES 102
APPENDIX D - INTERVIEW RESPONSES 103




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 127
VII
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 2.1 U.S. CONVENTIONAL FORCES 22
TABLE 3.1 HARD-TO-ACQUIRE COMPONENTS 32
VIM
LIST OF FIGURES




A. FOCUS OF THE STUDY
The sustainability and maintainability of Department of Defense (DOD)
procured items relies heavily upon the availability and uninterrupted flow of spare
parts to meet the needs of the nation's military forces. Acceptable levels of
mission readiness to meet the requirements of contingency operations is but one
of a myriad of reasons that spare parts availability is of such critical importance.
This research effort will focus on the identification of impediments to the
availability of spare parts (spares) and the identification of alternative actions
available to minimize and/or eliminate this occurrence. The research will look
specifically at the Army aviation, rotary wing, spare parts commodity area.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary intent of this research effort is to provide an identification and
an analysis of impediments to the acquisition of spare parts. These impediments
will be categorized into pre-nonavailability and post nonavailability issues and
identified as either controllable by the Government or its contractors. In addition
to the identification of impediments to spares acquisition, it will provide a selected
case analysis of how several current nonavailability issues were addressed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In support of the primary objective of this study the following research
question is posed:
What are the primary impediments to the acquisition of Army rotary wing
aircraft spare parts in the current DOD acquisition process?
In support of the primary research question, the following subsidiary
questions are posed:
1. Which impediments are pre-nonavailability and which impediments are
post nonavailability issues?
2. Which impediments are controllable by the Government and which are
controllable by its contractors?
3. Are there types of components, within aviation commodity areas,
which traditionally experience a higher degree of nonavailability than
other components, and if so what are their characteristics?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research gathered for this study came from a variety of sources and
utilized several collection techniques. Information was gathered using telephonic
and personal interviews, archival research, a mailed questionnaire and a
selected case analysis of a sampling of hard-to-acquire aviation components.
Sources of interview information included the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop
Command (ATCOM), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc. Principal parties interviewed within ATCOM included the
contracting, material management, production management, breakout
engineering, Huey Product Management (PM) and Blackhawk Product
Management offices. Principal parties interviewed within DLA included the
technical section, aircraft structural components section and policy branch. The
contract manager for military spares administration was interviewed at Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.. Both structured and unstructured interviews were used
during this portion of the data collection process.
Archival research included the use of the Naval Postgraduate Schools
Dudley Knox Library, the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE), the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and an Air Force
Institute of Technology periodical listings search.
A questionnaire, enclosed as Appendix A, discussing spare parts
obsolescence, one of the more difficult nonavailability issues to address, was
sent out to ATCOM, DLA and Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. It focused on a variety
of generic obsolescence issues.
A series of case analyses were conducted on a list of five hard-to-acquire
components. This listing was provided by the Huey Product Managers office as
the PMs current top five spares nonavailability issues.
E. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The scope of this study is limited to determining what are the current
impediments to maintaining spare parts availability for Army rotor wing aircraft.
The intent of this study is not to fix blame or to seek to justify nonavailability
occurrences.
When utilized, case analysis was limited to components for the Army's UH-1,
Huey helicopter. This airframe was selected for illustrative purposes because of
its status as a mature, fielded system and also because it is more than half way
through its system life cycle.
Recommendations are provided as, and are limited to, alternatives for
contracting personnel to pursue in precluding and/or resolving nonavailability
issues. However, an all inclusive list of alternatives is not provided and is not
within the scope of this study. Recommendations are focused on actions to be
taken by the Government and/or its contractors. They are presented as overall
concepts and are not exhaustively detailed (e.g., providing all necessary steps to
reach their accomplishment).
Although this study is limited to nonavailability issues involving Army rotary
wing aircraft, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations have applicability
to virtually any commodity area. Commodity specific nonavailability factors are
identified where applicable.
F. LIMITATIONS
No significant limitations were encountered during the conduct of this study.
It is the researcher's contention that the availability of personnel and research
material was such that the most critical, current impediments to the availability of
spare parts were identified and adequately addressed.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
The research effort is based on three general assumptions. First, it is
assumed that the reader has a familiarity with the DOD procurement system and
standard military terminology.
Second, our current defense budget cuts and the associated military force
drawdown is the environment that we will face in the future. Further, in the near
term, the annual defense budget will at best stabilize at its current reduced level,
and at worst will continue to be reduced over time.
Third, the issue of spare parts nonavailability will be more importance,
and a greater issue to the acquisition community in our current environment of
force drawdowns and budget reductions. This is due to the constraining affects
of these issues on our resource base.
H. DEFINITIONS /ACRONYMS
Definitions are defined in the body of the text. Standard military definitions
were used throughout the text.
Acronyms are spelled out in their first appearance in the body of the text. As
a quick reference, all acronyms which were not felt to be common to everyday
use, or those that could be misinterpreted were incorporated into Appendix B, in
alphabetical order.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is divided into a series of five chapters. Each chapter builds on
prior ones and is aimed at helping the reader logically progress through a thought
process to arrive at a set of conclusions and recommendations, supported by a
thorough analysis of the available data.
This chapter has introduced the reader to the focus, objectives, research
questions, methodology, scope, limitations and assumptions of the thesis. It has
developed the foundation for the research and established its purpose in a clear
and concise manner.
Chapter II, background, sets the stage for the remainder of the research
effort. After a brief introduction, it describes the U.S. Army and Defense Logistics
Agency spare parts procurement processes to establish the parameters within
which their respective procurements occur. This is followed by a discussion of a
series of major factors which help to shape our current procurement environment
and a brief summary of the chapter's contents.
Chapter III, presentation and analysis of research findings, serves two
functions. First it reports on the data collected during the research effort.
Separate reports are provided on the results of archival research, personal and
telephonic interviews, questionnaire responses, component case analysis, and
interspersed general observations of the researcher.
Second, it analyzes the data captured using various collection techniques as
described earlier in the chapter. It further discusses two current DOD spare parts
procurement programs, identifies the characteristics of nonavailable components,
discusses risk assessment and management, and closes with a summary
statement.
Chapter IV, alternative actions, starts out by identifying impediments to spare
parts availability discovered during the data collection and groups these
impediments. It further discusses actions available to combat the occurrence of
spare parts nonavailability and groups courses of action into two areas of focus:
pre-nonavailability actions and post nonavailability actions. The chapter
concludes with a chapter summary.
Chapter V, conclusions and recommendations, the study's closing chapter,
covers exactly that. It brings out those conclusions and recommendations
arrived at logically from the research effort as addressed in the study's preceding
chapters. It further provides answers to the primary and subsidiary research
questions and concludes by identifying areas for further research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Spare parts are one of the most critical elements required to sustain fielded
systems. Not only systems, but virtually any item utilized by the Services,
regardless of its purpose, requires the acquisition of spares to ensure its
operational use. The timely acquisition of spares and the maintenance of
adequate sources of supply further guarantees equipment mission readiness.
Problems involving nonavailability of spares are not new to the acquisition
community. In the last decade, spare parts issues such as overpricing, lack of
adequate competition and lack of availability of spares have placed the Services
in the uncomfortable position of realizing their shortcomings in those areas. The
environment in which we operate today will no longer tolerate the types of ill-fated
procurements and blunders of the past.
One of the particularly interesting aspects of aviation spares, which this
research focuses on, is that items which are not normally of a mission critical
nature, such as nuts, bolts, and washers, can easily ground an entire fleet of
aircraft. The possibility of severe repercussions from equipment nonavailability
issues is greatly increased in this commodity area. The acquisition challenges of
procuring aviation spares are boundless. Subsequent chapters will further
expound on these issues.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to two topics. First, an overview of
the spares procurement process for the Army, specifically those of the Aviation
and Troop Support Command (ATCOM), and the Department of Defense's
Defense Logistics Agency. This is intended to familiarize the reader with the
similarities and differences existing between the two agencies. Second, an
identification and description of five factors shaping our current procurement
environment is provided to help establish a set of parameters within which the
acquisition community operates. Some of these factors, which have been
introduced into the environment within the last few years, offer unique
challenges, requiring innovation and creative thinking. Both topics, the spares
procurement process and factors shaping our procurement environment, will be
explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters at which point their relationship
to spares nonavailability will be discussed in depth.
B. SPARE PARTS PROCUREMENT PROCESS
This section will provide an overview of the spare parts procurement process
for the Army and the Defense Logistics Agency(DLA). It will also describe the
transition of spares responsibility from the Army to DLA.
It would probably be helpful, at this point, to provide a definition of aviation
spare parts and further describe the two classes of spares. Spare parts are
defined as:
Spares and repair parts, both repairable and consumable, acquired for use
in the maintenance, overhaul, and repair of aircraft. It includes items,
spares, repair parts, parts, subassemblies, components, and subsystems,
but excludes end items. [Ref 1 : p. 5]
The two classes of spare parts, consumables and repairables, are defined as
follows:
Consumable spare parts. Consumables are spare parts that are disposed
of when they fail or are used up. In some cases they loose their identity
through their use (e.g., lubricants). Consumables are normally less
expensive than repairables. They include items such as bearings, nuts,
bolts, and screws. Consumables comprise 75-80 percent of the spare part
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inventory, yet they represent only 20-25 percent of DOD's monetary
investment in spare parts [Ref 2 : p. 28].
Repairable spare parts. Repairables on the other hand are spare parts that
are repaired when they fail, or on a pre-arranged rework cycle, and then
returned to the inventory. The Army generally refers to these as spare
parts. Repairables include such things as hydraulic pumps, generators, and
valve assemblies. These parts are repaired by maintenance personnel at
either the organizational, intermediate, or depot level using consumable
spare parts. These comprise the remainder of the spares inventory. [Ref 23
: p. 29].
The Army has traditionally supported its own requirements for spares
acquisitions, minus those items which were common to more than one Service's
aircraft. These items were handled by DLA. Spares were acquired by the Army
and stocked at National Inventory Control Points (NICP) for distribution as
needed. In addition to NICPs, depots stocked items to facilitate the timely
execution of depot repairs. Intermediate level and unit level maintenance facilities
stocked mostly common items (bench stock) for routine scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance requirements. As an item transitioned from the unit
and intermediate levels to the depot level of repair, the complexity and number of
stocked parts increased with the authorized level of work performed. [Ref 3]
Stockage levels were based on anticipated demand which was calculated
from demand history, the introduction of new requirements, and projected
nonrecurring needs (e.g., unusual, one time, depot overhaul requirements).
Based on these projected demands, stocks were on-hand or on order to meet
requirements as they materialized. [Ref 3]
The Defense Logistics Agency worked under a slightly different system.
They have traditionally been responsible for spares for those end items common
to more than one Service. A large portion of these items had short lead times
and were not stocked. They were simply ordered when a requirement occurred.
Stockage and ordering decisions were based on weapons criticality or demand
criteria per time period (e.g., number of requests or hits for the item per month).
In a few instances the lack of the commercial availability of an end item would
drive acquisition decisions. Short lead time, nonstocked items were ordered
when requested by an end user, were shipped as direct vendor deliverables, and
were lead time away from delivery. Identifying the need and ensuring the timely
processing of the request prior to the anticipated need were two keys to
successful sustainment under this system. [Ref 4]
As a result of the Defense Management Report (DMR) and its resultant
decisions (DMRDs), this process has been somewhat altered with the purpose
of establishing and benefiting from the centralized management of spares.
Cognizance over spares, for the most part, has been shifted away from the
Services and given to DLA. DLA now has responsibility for spares procurement
for all the military Services and for the operation of wholesale depot operations
[Ref 4]. The separate Services have retained cognizance over depot level repair
facilities (e.g., Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD), for depot level aircraft
maintenance), design unstable items
,
and safety of flight (SOF) items [Ref 5].
This shift in responsibility has resulted in a current transfer (October 1992) of
7000 consumables items per month from the Army [Ref 4], with about 1000 of
these coming from the aviation community [Ref 6]. These transfers are staged
and become effective on predetermined dates. On these dates, "paper transfers"
of responsibility occur. Existing stocks of spares, at other than DLA locations,
remain on site until stocks are exhausted at which time the positioning of future
stocks shifts to DLA [Ref 6]. These transfers have resulted in a number of
concerns voiced by both the Army and DLA. Most of these revolve around each
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agency's interest in the other's ability to properly and effectively manage spares
acquisition. Some of these concerns appear to be difficult to address while
others will work themselves out over time as the slope of the learning curve
shallows out. [Ref 6] [Ref 5]
C. FACTORS SHAPING THE PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT
Over the years there have been a myriad of factors which have helped
shape the current procurement environment. Pressures exerted internally, from
within the procurement community, and external pressures from Congress,
special interest groups and the general public, have been driving forces for the
procurement reforms of the past and recent DOD initiatives. Our current
environment which has evolved from this ongoing evolutionary process is
continuing to be shaped by the outcome of lessons learned. The researcher has
identified five factors which currently appear to be having a broad impact and
profound effect on the procurement process and therefore are likely to dictate
how procurements, to include those of spares, will be handled in the future.
These factors are the requirement for competition, best value contracting,
modernization initiatives, the declining defense base, and the military force
drawdown. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an overview of these
factors. Chapter IV, data analysis, will expand on the discussion of these factors
and delve into how they are actually affecting spares availability.
1 . Impact of the requirement for competition
Few if any legislative actions have had the degree of impact on the
acquisition community as the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). "Passed
by Congress in 1984, CICA amended the three principal statutes that prescribed
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The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947.
2. The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.
3. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974.
Under CICA, Government agencies were required to promote 'full and
open competition" in the procurement of property and services. "FAR part 6
defines full and open competition to mean that all responsible sources are
permitted to compete for a contract action" [Ref 8 : p. 123]. To accomplish this
task, legislation provided for the use of either sealed bidding or competitive
proposals (negotiations) unless exemption criteria were met. CICA marked a
fundamental shift away from the past practice of favoring noncompetitive
negotiations. This shift was greatly influenced by the legislative pressure exerted
by Congress in its efforts to monitor the expenditure of public funds. One of the
negative effects of CICA, which was brought out during research, was the
extensive amount of administrative time utilized in the pursuit of competition,
sometimes at the expense of timely procurements [Ref 8 : p. 118-123]. The
implementation of CICA, to some degree, has forced innovation to become a
more commonly used tool to overcome such difficulties.
2. Impact of best value contracting
It is the researchers opinion that the emergence of best value contracting
and its use by the Government has ushered in a fundamental shift in the way it
selects with whom it will do business when utilizing competitively negotiated
procurements. The old school professed the advantages of source selection
based solely on the criteria of lowest bid, irrespective of other possible value
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added factors. Fortunately, the procurement community has learned from such
ill-fated procurements as the Army's SGT York and the Navy's A- 12 Avenger that
this style of contracting does not always yield the best results and/or meet the
Government's need [Ref 9 : p. 1]. These unfortunate examples of procurement
process failures have helped form the catalyst for change which has resulted in
the realization that the Government needed to adopt, when possible, a more
commercial style competitive environment. The essence of best value
contracting is captured in the following definition. Best value contracting is best
utilized:
... when the basis for contract award states that factors other than cost/price
(such as technical merit, past performance, and management capabilities)
will be considered in order to determine which proposal has the best
promise of meeting the Government's need [Ref 9 : p. 3].
Selecting proposals which consider both price and non-price related
factors provides a better opportunity for selecting the proposal which is most
advantageous to the Government. Two goals of best value contracting are..." to
increase the chance of a successful contract and decrease the chance of a
successful protest" [Ref 10 : p. 33]. In order to make this selection, and
accomplish these goals, the source selection authority (SSA) or his/her
designated representative must make a value judgment. This value judgment
requires support from a set of criteria equitably applied to all proposals in the
competitive range. This latitude provided to the SSA greatly increases their
responsibility and opens the door for formal protests if the source selection
process is faulted in any manner.
What does the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) say about best
value contracting and the use of Contracting Officer (CO) value judgments? It
explicitly encourages the use of best value but falls short of giving an explicit
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definition or specific structure to the source selection methodology. FAR
15.605(c) states:
While the lowest price or lowest total cost to the Government is properly the
deciding factor in many source selections, in certain acquisitions the
Government may select the source whose proposal offers the greatest
value to the Government in terms of performance and other factors. This
may be the case, for example, in the acquisition of research and
development or professional services, or when cost reimbursement
contracting is anticipated.
The latitude afforded the contracting officer by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation is far reaching. It relies on the CO's personal judgment and
experience to implement best value effectively. The lack of specificity in the FAR
is where the CO draws his/her judgment authority. Thus far, the judicial system
has recognized and honored the flexibility afforded the CO by the FAR [Ref 26 :
p. 11].
Judgment is not only critical in the final source selection but equally as
important in the initial selection of criteria and their relative importance. These
criteria (factors) are key to the source selection process. Each procurement's
criteria must be tailored to meet the varying requirements of each type of
acquisition. This is a requirement of the FAR, as well as, the requirement to
utilize quality as a factor in each source selection [Ref 1 1 : p. 6]. Tailoring is an
important feature since virtually no two procurements are identical in scope. Best
value offers the CO an opportunity to best meet the sustainment needs of the
end user. This is yet another example of innovation and good business
judgment.
3. Impact of modernization initiatives
Modernization of the Army's equipment is of critical importance if the
United States is to maintain its capability to project its combat power to
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contingency areas and survive in a host of operating environments.
Modernization is a continuous process. The aviation community has benefitted
from this process, in the last decade, through the fielding of such aircraft
platforms as the Blackhawk (UH-60L), the Chinook (CH-47D) and the Kiowa
(OH-58D). Each of these modernized systems have significantly enhanced the
force's previous capability.
"The modernization investment strategy is threat and resource driven"
[Ref 12 : p. 46]. As such, the military encounters unique challenges in the face of
a diminished threat and rapidly dwindling resources. It is clear that the
acquisition environment is being realigned with regard to changes in threat, the
reduction of risk, a new political environment, economic conditions, and declining
resources. With these existing constraints in mind, the Army has developed near
and long-term modernization objectives. Near term objectives include:
Pursuing material solutions for only the most critical battlefield deficiencies,
and to focus the limited, available, long term modernization resources on
leap-ahead technology - such as the next generation scout helicopter [Ref
13: p. 62].
Modernization in the near term will be accomplished by upgrading our
fielded equipment to insert modern technology that will provide us with the
capability necessary to maintain a decisive combat edge. When upgrades
are no longer effective, new systems will be developed, manufactured and
fielded [Ref 12 : p. 46].
The Army's long term modernization objectives are focused on the
maintenance of technical and tactical superiority. This will have to be achieved
with a smaller, better trained, better equipped force.
The Army's long term objectives are designed to avoid technological
surprise and maintain overmatch capabilities in lethality and survivability.
Prior to investment in new solutions, a review of potential alternate solutions
will be considered as possible cost-effective alternatives to a new start [Ref
12: p. 46].
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In order to achieve both its near term and long term modernization
objectives, the Army has adopted a set of six guiding principles for this effort.
These principles, outlined in the United States Army's FY 93 posture statement,
capture the essence of modernization while operating with constrained
resources. The principles are [Ref 12 : p. 42]:
1. Continuous modernization.
2. Priority to power projection/contingency capabilities.
3. Modernize by force packages (groupings of units with compatible
equipment).
4. Provide maximum lethality and survivability of the force.
5. Optimize readiness and training.
6. Build and maintain balanced force capability.
Throughout the continuous process of force modernization, the
acquisition community has the unique challenge of sustaining the existing fielded
systems which may, in some cases, have a lower priority of logistical support.
Meeting sustainment requirements with constrained resources will force the
support priority to shift to modernization efforts. The likelihood of nonavailability
of spares will increase as newer systems are fielded and as older technology
becomes harder to support as industries focus shifts to current requirements.
Diminishing sources of supply will occur as technologies and systems approach
the end of their respective life cycles.
4. Impact of the declining defense base
The decline of the United States defense base is a critical issue in the
sustainment of the nation's defenses. "American deterrent strategy depends on a
healthy industrial base" [Ref 14 : p. 12]. This base is critical not only for the
production of major weapon systems but has the potential to affect virtually any
16
end item utilized in the nation's defense. Based on this premise, military spares,
which help ensure the mission readiness posture of fielded systems, appear to
somewhat susceptibility to market trends and current economic forces.
With this in mind, an important question to ask is what comprises our
defense base? The common misconception is that it comprises only those
industries which directly support the production of items for the military Services
to use in the defense of the nation. This is a rather simplistic view, and one with
which the researcher initially started. Under closer examination, it became clear
that this view was too narrow for the scope of the Services requirements.
The defense industrial base generally comprises the same manufacturers
that produce goods for the commercial sector. Although a number of
companies rely primarily on the Department of Defense as their principal
market, few total industries do. The Defense Department buys
manufactured goods from more than a quarter million firms, encompassing
more than 215 industries. As a result, a legitimate interest in the defense
industrial base is inseparable from an interest in the U.S. industrial base as
a whole [Ref 14 : p. 13].
After the realization of the actual magnitude of the problem, the next
logical question is what has been the catalyst of this decline? The answers to
this question are varied and encompass areas which require both industry and
Government responses. A comprehensive list of reasons is too lengthy and
exhaustive for the discussion required here. The researcher has, however,
selected several issues that were noted as recurring themes during the conduct
of this research. These causes are: the emergence of peace and the vanishing
threat [Ref 12 : p. 51-55], the accompanying reduction in the U.S. defense budget
[Ref 15 : p. 18-19], the mounting deficit [Ref 16 : p. 1-12], an increasing
dependence on foreign sources [Ref 17 : p. 22-24], adversarial relations between
DOD and its vendors [Ref 18 : p. 45, 50-53], and the typical life cycle of military
equipment [Ref 19 : p. 11-12].
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The emergence of peace and the vanishing threat, whether seen as
perceived or actual, is having an astounding impact on the Department of
Defense. Its ripple effect can be seen in the questioning of existing military
doctrine, the reshaping of the existing force structure, the overseas positioning
and provisioning of forces. The emergence of peace, it is plain to see, is unlikely
to bring prosperity to the military or the defense industry.
With the U.S. facing mounting debt and vanishing threats, the public and
Congress are questioning - and, in some case, refusing - continued buildup
of the nation's defense systems [Ref 20 : p. 54].
One of the most visible results of the emergence of peace in Eastern
Europe and the end of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union is the declining
defense budget.
The changes in the nature of the threat around the world, and the reality of
the budget, mean that our defense budgets are going to be leaner in the
years ahead [Ref 14 : p. 19].
This decline did not occur overnight, it has been a progressive, iterative
process. The procurement portion of the defense budget ... " is half of what it
was in 1985 in real dollar terms" [Ref 14 : p. 4].
As a result of this reduction of available funds, priorities for support will
have to be revisited. This thesis proposes to the reader that it is logical to
assume that priority shifts will result in support for newer systems at the expense
of older systems which are at, or reaching, the end of their respective system life
cycles. This will have a direct impact on the procurement of spares for these
lower priority end items.
The mounting Federal deficit will no doubt be a beneficiary of part of any
realignment of Government funding. Growing public sentiment and discontent
over this issue will likely accelerate the decline of the defense budget. With the
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popular belief in the outbreak of peace and the perception of a less well-defined
threat, interest appears to be shifting from defense to the budget's other two
discretionary accounts, international affairs and domestics. Additionally, these
macrobudget discretionary categories have spending caps imposed on them by
the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990. These spending caps are strictly
enforced through the use of mini-sequesters, which are in effect the reduction of
the accounts by the amount it exceeds its cap. [Ref 16 : p. 5]
Confirmation of the shift in budget emphasis can be seen in the FY 92
appropriations for the budget's discretionary accounts.
Total discretionary spending increased about 2.3 percent between FY 91 -
92, with defense having minimal increases in budget authority, 0.9 percent,
while the domestic account increased at a 4.7 percent rate [Ref 16 : p. 6].
What really impacts on the discretionary accounts is the requirement of
the BEA to meet specified deficit targets for FY 91 - 95 [Ref 16 : p. 5-7]. During
this period entitlement programs which are mandatorily funded, are expected to
grow over time. These programs include such things as Medicare and
unemployment compensation. As these programs expand, the only method of
achieving mandatory deficit targets is to cut discretionary spending. The
researcher proposes that the preferred method of reducing discretionary
spending, given the current environment, is to reduce the defense account. This
appears, for the near term, to be the "politically safe" track for politicians to follow
in setting their budgetary priorities.
Increasing dependency on foreign sources is another critical concern
[Ref 15 : p. 22]. This dependency is eroding the foundation of our industrial
infrastructure and threatening our existence as a world industrial leader. The
U.S. has already lost significant portions of the domestic market in areas such as
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machining and electronics and it has been projected that, "...by the year 2000,
the United States could be nearly totally dependent on Japanese supplies of key
electronic components and equipment" [Ref 14 : p. 13]. This trend, if not put in
check, could have a devastating impact on our ability to sustain ourselves during
any future conflict. A scenario could evolve such that the support needed for a
particular system could rest in the hands of our adversary.
Adversarial relationships between the Government and its contractors,
and the complexity (lack of user friendliness) of the procurement process has
increased the number of firms discontinuing or reducing their business
association with the Government. Forging working relationships based on trust is
imperative today more than ever before. As stated in the July 1988 report to the
Secretary of Defense by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)),
titled Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness
,
... there is a powerful need to build a cooperative relationship between the
Department of Defense and industry that will lower barriers to
improvements, enable more effective policy development and
implementation, and contribute to the national goal of a strong industrial
base [Ref 21 : p. 40].
A study by Dr. David V. Lamm, titled, "Why Firms Refuse DOD Business:
An Analysis of Rationale", further validates the assertion that DOD desperately
needs to seek methods of strengthening its relations with its industrial partners.
Industry should be incentivized to conduct business with the Government. As Dr.
Lamm points out in his introductory remarks,
Government red tape, extensive rules and regulations, bureaucratic
inaction, and micromanagement of contractors' businesses are but a few of
the criticisms leveled at the procurement process. There is a growing belief
that as the Government continues to tighten its grip on both contractors and
subcontractors through congressional legislation, firms will be squeezed out
of the supplier base, unable and unwilling to compete for DOD business
[Ref 18: p. 45].
20
The message here is clear. The adversarial relations developed over
the last few decades are no longer acceptable as a method of conducting
business with civilian contractors. New relationships must be forged out of trust
and mutual respect.
Lastly, the typical life cycles of military equipment further complicates the
problem of the declining defense base. " The acquisition cycle for major weapon
systems, as an example, runs anywhere from 8-12 years" [Ref 22 : p. 11].
Additionally, a major system can remain in the inventory for 20 to 30 years or
longer as is the case with the Army's UH-1, Huey helicopter. It has been in the
inventory since 1959 in one configuration or another. In total, the acquisition time
and service life of equipment can add up to several decades making logistical
support increasingly more difficult over time. As a result, the needs of the military
habitually fall behind the technological advances of industry and commercial
markets. Defense contractors who continue to support older systems and rely on
these alone to sustain themselves are operating on borrowed time. Another key
point is that many contractors tend to mix their business between commercial
markets and the Government. Over time they find that continuing production of
commercially obsolete components, solely to meet DOD requirements, is not
advantageous from a business standpoint. The end result of all this is that
businesses either exit a market segment, switch product lines within a market
segment, diversify, or reduce production of defense products. Any of these
choices results in the same outcome - a reduction in the defense base and the
potential occurrence of nonavailability.
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5. Impact of the military force drawdown
The impact of the drawdown of the U.S. military force structure is
intertwined with- the impact of modernization initiatives and the declining defense
base. All three, in part, if not in total, are a result of our diminished threat. With
this factor in mind, the United States Army Posture Statement for FY93 states the
following.
The Army shapes its forces to fulfill the U.S. need for a worldwide,
sustained land combat capability. Its structure is carefully tailored within
manpower and fiscal constraints to optimize warfighting capabilities against
the multiple and varied threats to U.S. interests abroad [Ref 12 : p. 39].
Two keys to determining forcestructure, as outlined above, are
manpower and fiscal constraints. The President, in responding to these
limitations, has proposed substantial reductions in U.S. conventional forces.
Table 2.1 outlines the President's proposal for the Army's base force for FY95
and is contrasted with proposals from other politicians on Capitol Hill.












Active 18 12 8 9 9
Reserve 10 6 2 6 4
Cadre 2
Source: Program Manager, July-Aug 1992, page 45
If these proposals are realized, sustainability of such a reduced force will
be even more crucial than before. However, any reduction in conventional forces
will have an associated reduction in its support structure. This equates to a
smaller civilian workforce which constitutes the largest portion of the acquisition
community. With this smaller workforce, the acquisition professional will have to
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be a better educated, more well-equipped individual, capable of responding to
varied and unique situations (e.g., nonavailability issues). With the
implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA),
steps are being taken to ensure that this professionalization of the workforce
takes place. It appears that the trend of "doing more with less" will be with us for
the foreseeable future
D. SUMMARY
Providing the aviation community with its large number of mission critical
spares requires thorough planning and execution. The differences between the
Army's and DLA's procurement processes and the transition of spares
responsibility between these agencies is but one of the many areas of concern in
spares availability.
Along with shifting spares cognizance, factors shaping our procurement
environment further delineate the boundaries within which acquisition
professionals must function. Some of the factors which help to shape the
procurement environment and impact on the acquisition and continuous
availability of spares are: the Competition in Contracting Act, best value
contracting, modernization initiatives, the declining defense base, and the military
force drawdown. These factors play a key role in shaping acquisition policy and
their significance must be thoroughly understood to function in an efficient and
effective manner.
This chapter has, in essence, looked at spares nonavailability at a macro
level. The following chapter, a presentation and analysis of research findings,
will examine data gathered during the research effort and focus on a more micro
level by discussing archival research, interviews, questionnaires, and component
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case analysis. It will also describe two current DOD spare parts procurement
programs, identify some of the key characteristics of nonavailable components,
and will discuss^ risk assessment and management.
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III. A PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present and analyze the information and resources utilized
to conduct research on spare parts nonavailability. Data were collected using
archival research, personal and telephonic interviews (structured and
unstructured), a questionnaire on component obsolescence, and selected
component case analysis. Each of these collection methods revealed a variety of
considerations and concerns regarding spares nonavailability. These will be
discussed in greater detail in Sections B and C.
The remainder of the chapter is comprised of a presentation of two current
DOD spare parts procurement programs aimed at resolving nonavailability issues
at differing stages of the acquisition process, the identification of the salient
characteristics of nonavailable components, a discussion of the assessment and
management of risk and a chapter summary.
B. RESEARCH METHODS
This section comprises a summarized presentation of the research data
gathered using the following methods of data collection: archival research,
personal and telephonic interviews, and a mailed questionnaire. As an aside, an
interesting
,
and in retrospect logical, pattern of data began to appear during this
collection effort. Archival research seems to most often provide a macro, or
larger issue, type of data while interviews and questionnaire responses focused
more on the micro, or smaller organizational level. This recognition might
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possible serve some use when attempting to focus or scope other research
efforts when a desired level of response is sought. Another interesting point is
that a lot of the Jssues looked at can be seen as timeless and/or cyclical. These
issues resurface periodically, are dealt with, and recur at some later date.
1 . Archival research
Sources utilized during this phase of research included, the Naval
Postgraduate School's Dudley Knox Library, the Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC), an Air Force Institute of Technology periodical listings search, use of
trade publications, professional journals, other theses and independent research
efforts.
As stated in this chapter's opening comments, this research resulted in
the uncovering of macro issues, those of a generalized nature, affecting the
entire spectrum of DOD acquisitions. If one were to select a level of
responsibility or influence for resolving these issues, they would more than likely
rest at the separate Service or DOD level. Issues of this magnitude are not
easily resolved, influenced, or impacted on by lesser levels of authority. While all
professionals should play a role in resolving these issues, they typically call for
"top down" initiatives.
Chapter II discussed, in detail, two areas developed from archival
research. The first was the identification of the SAIP and RAMP programs. As
spares management tools, these programs were found to be two of the best
approaches to resolving nonavailability issues. Each addressed the issue from a
different perspective, allowing application of the appropriate process at alternate
phases of the acquisition process. The second area of interest that developed
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was that of the factors shaping the procurement environment. The most
pressing, frequently noted issues were: the impact of the requirement for
competition, the impact of best value contracting, the impact of modernization
initiatives, the impact of the declining defense base, and the impact of the military
force drawdown.
The area of component obsolescence was researched and found to be
an area with little available data. The only substantive work found on the issue
was a graduate thesis by Lieutenant Commander Elizabeth Ann Tracy titled,
"Component Obsolescence: Presentation of a Decision Process for Assessing
and Selecting Alternative Solutions Applicable to Major Weapon Systems
Production". The focus of the study (Ref 23) was on microelectronic circuit
obsolescence, but the issues raised and the solutions proposed are viable
alternatives to most commodity areas.
A research study (Ref 24) was examined which focused on reliability
improvements in the Army's Light Helicopter program. An interesting twist to the
nonavailability issue emerged to the researcher after reading this particular text.
The author repeatedly pointed to an anticipated significant reduction in the
demand for spares. This reduction was achieved, for the most part, by
eliminating the vibrations normally associated with routine rotary wing flight. The
key point here is that by engineering in reliability, the potential occurrence of
nonavailability is lessened by a similar reduction in the demand for spares. This
stresses the point that innovation provides alternative methods of dealing with
issues and that the secondary affects of an action can be as beneficial as its
original intent. By reducing the requirement for spares, the possibility of
nonavailability was also reduced.
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Another research effort (Ref 25) on aircraft sustainability was also
studied. Its conclusion was that at some point in time, toward the end of a
system's life cycle, the cost of supporting that system outweighs the benefit
received from continuing to operate or support it. The primary reasons for this
increasing cost were: spares obsolescence, spares nonavailability, increasing
maintenance requirements, shifting priorities, age of the system, aging
technology and the cost to upgrade. Long term support equated to high risk [Ref
25 : p. 1-6]. At some point, retirement from the inventory becomes the only cost
effective alternative.
Several articles were found which addressed the situation where
unforecast parts were required and only a short period of time was available to
procure these parts. This was generally referred to in the literature as parts-on-
demand (POD) [Ref 26 : p. 5]. The recurring chosen alternative, to meet this
demand, was flexible manufacturing as used in the RAMP program. It was
recognized that nonavailability issues occur regardless of the degree of planning
and that short-lead time alternatives must be available to facilitate a timely
resolution of the issue [Ref 26 : p. 17].
Other areas addressed in research involved the resolving of
nonavailability issues through the cannibalization of components (Meyte), the
assessment and streamlining of the DOD parts control program (Office of IG), the
controlling of contractor delinquent deliveries (Air Force Audit Agency), and the
need for interim contractor logistics support during the initial fielding of systems to
support spares availability (USAMC).
The availability of material relating to the subject was such that limiting
the quantity analyzed was required to keep the research from expanding outside
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its original scope. The data evaluated during archival research, when melded
together with interviews and questionnaire responses and component case
analysis, provided an adequate basis from which to conduct research and draw
logical conclusions and recommendations. The material contained in the
previous section is representative of the material analyzed during archival
research. Many sources were repetitive in nature, outdated due to advances in
methods of acquisition or not germane to the central issue addressed by this
thesis and as such were not included in the analysis.
2. Interviews
Both telephonic and personal interviews were conducted as part of the
research effort. Whenever possible, respondents (subject area experts) were
asked to participate in both interviews and as members of the questionnaire pool.
In some instances both telephonic and personal interviews were conducted with
the same people.
Participants in the interview pool provided, in some cases, rather frank
and pointed answers to questions. In order to provide a degree of anonymity to
respondents, references to such comments will not be identified in the normal
manner. Where applicable, a statement such as, "an interviewed expert stated
that ...", will be utilized to identify controversial issues and their associated
responses.
A diversity of skills were selected to be in the interview pool. This was
done to acquire a larger perspective on the issues addressed as opposed to
simply interviewing a large number of like type skills and receiving answers of a
lesser variety and from a narrower perspective. Interview sources included the
U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM), the Defense Logistics
29
Agency (DLA), and Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Principal parties interviewed
within ATCOM included the contracting, material management, production
management, breakout engineering, Huey Product Management and Blackhawk
Product Management offices. Principal parties interviewed within DLA included
the technical section, aircraft structural components section and policy branch.
The contract manager for military spares administration was interviewed at Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.
Due to the diversity of the respondents' job skills and therefore their
differing responsibilities with respect to the issue of nonavailability, interviews
were of an open ended nature. Not all respondents were asked the same
questions nor were questions limited to those prepared prior to the interviews.
This was done to facilitate the generation of answers that were unencumbered by
questions which would lead in a particular direction of response. While specific
questions were prepared ahead of time, they were asked when appropriate
(timing) in the context of the particular discussion. Each interview generated its
own unique questions based on the responses given in previous questions. This
approach was found to be most advantageous in regard to allowing the
respondents, when appropriate, to direct the interview. The researcher, however,
reserved the option of redirecting the focus of the discussion when necessary.
Appendix D provides a compilation of the relevant questions and
answers from each interview. Responses for the sake of brevity have been
summarized, but their intent and content have not been altered.
3. Questionnaire
As part of the research effort, a questionnaire addressing spare parts
obsolescence was sent out to various agencies within DOD and to civilian
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industry. The questionnaire focused on what the researcher perceived was the
most difficult type of nonavailability to resolve. The questionnaire responses
validated the researcher's initial impressions regarding the sensitivity of this
issue.
The researcher asked twenty-one, general in nature, questions regarding
obsolescence which were structured to facilitate ease of answering. As part of
the analysis, each question will be individually addressed, in the order they
appeared to the respondents.
Unfortunately, due to the low response rate, approximately 6.7% (2 of
30), no accurate consensus of opinion, from a statistical standpoint, could be
drawn from the responses. One respondent, after contacting the researcher,
answered the questionnaire from the view of nonavailability versus
obsolescence. The only respondent to answer the questionnaire in the context it
was asked was Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. The researcher can only gather
from the lack of responsiveness to the questionnaire that either an atmosphere of
apathy exists regarding spares obsolescence or that the subject itself has been
placed in the "too hard" category.
Appendix E provides a compilation of answers to each question.
Responses to questions are given in summary form.
C. COMPONENT CASE ANALYSIS
The aircraft platform utilized for the component case analysis was the Army's
UH-1, Huey utility helicopter. It has been in the inventory for over three decades
in one configuration or another. It offers unique challenges due to its age and the
level of technology incorporated into its design.
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Five hard-to-acquire components were identified and analyzed to ascertain
what led them to become nonavailability issues. The Huey Product Manager
(PM) identified these components as recent areas of concern while attempting to
provide uninterrupted support for the Huey fleet. The nomenclature and national
stock numbers (NSNs) of each of the five components analyzed are provided in
Table 3.1
TABLE 3.1 HARD-TO-ACQUIRE COMPONENTS
# Nomenclature NSN
1 main rotor yoke 1615-00-757-2905
2 main rotor grip 1615-01-057-1827
3 tension torsion strap 1615-01-063-4016
4 universal control lever 1615-00-829-6855
5 straight headless pin 5315-00-834-1418
Source: ATCOM, UH-1 Program Manager
General information regarding the nonavailability of these components was
provided through the Huey PM's office by one of their logistics management
specialists. Specific detail was provided through the ATCOM, material
management division, UH-1 coordinator, and though numerous telephonic
interviews.
The following case analysis briefs will address the five selected components
in the order they appear in Table 3.1 . Each analysis will consist of identification of
the problem, how and when the problem was identified, the root cause of the
resulting nonavailability issue, solutions examined, and action(s) ultimately
taken to resolve or avoid a break in sustainment.
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1. Main Rotor Yoke.
The first evaluated component was the main rotor yoke, NSN 1615-00-
757-2905. The difficulty with this component is the new requirement for fatigue
testing of the item. ATCOM has been working on meeting this requirement, since
it was placed on the item, approximately one and a half years ago.
The requirement for fatigue testing was placed on the component as the
result of a safety of flight (SOF) issue. Depot overhaul facilities found excessive
wear on the blade spindles of the main rotor hub. Subsequently engineers at
ATCOM tightened the testing requirements for the yoke to help prevent the
failure of the yoke and other associated rotor system components. This
additional testing requirement has turned into a nonavailability issue due to the
limited availability of qualified testing facilities. At this time, the Government still
has no good solution to the problem and no approved source. Another problem
is that there are no fatigue tested, baseline yokes, available to use as a gage to
test others against. A procurement has been placed with Bell Textron Helicopter,
Inc., but deliverables will not be received until sometime in calendar year 1993.
Once these items are received, the issue is not completely resolved. Tightened
tolerances will require the adjusting of depot level overhaul rates, which will
increase as a result of these new requirements. The depot overhaul rate, known
as the depot overhaul factor (DOF), is a means of forecasting component
requirements. A DOF is expressed by a quantity per end item and a percentage
of how many are required per a given number of end items overhauled. For
example, there is one yoke for each main rotor hub (end item) and if historical
data support the need to replace 48 out of 100 overhauled hubs, then the DOF
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for yokes is 0.48. That is, the number of end items overhauled x DOF = the
number of repair parts required per year.
Most components of this type have a multi-year lead time which must be
factored into forecasts. In addition to routine requirements, safety stock and
mobilization requirements must be brought back up to requirement levels as well.
As a result, any change in forecasts can significantly impact the capability to
adequately supply the needed component. It can take years to fully recover from
the effects of such a change given the quantity of items needed and the capacity
available to meet that need.
Careful coordination between the parties involved in the management of
spares (e.g., material management, contracting, quality assurance, engineers,
etc.) is paramount so that the best management decisions are made when issues
such as the main rotor yoke requirement occur. It is simply not good enough for
a decision to be made without input from all knowledgeable sources. Decisions
of this magnitude could potentially ground an entire aircraft fleet, for an indefinite
period of time. Such a grounding could severely impact unit mission readiness.




Is this a valid requirement and why was it not required earlier?
2. Was the incident prompting this change an isolated incident?
3. What is the impact of this decision on current procurements?
4. Are there other alternatives available?
5. How will mission readiness be affected by this decision?
6. Has input from all affected parties been received and evaluated?
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2. Main Rotor Grip.
The second evaluated component was the main rotor grip, NSN 1615-
01-057-1827. As the nomenclature indicates, this is the attachment point of the
main rotor blade to the main rotor hub. In this case, the component itself was not
the direct source of the issue. The problem evolved out of a depot overhaul
requirement to remove excess corrosion from aircraft main rotor grips taken off
aircraft undergoing airframe overhaul. During the overhaul process, engineers at
Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD) had observed the occurrence of frequent
excessive corrosion on main rotor grips. In order to remove this corrosion and
return the component to stockage, the process of shot-peening was chosen as
the best solution. In non-engineering terms, this process is similar in concept to
sandblasting. The consequence of not completing this, or a like process, could
render the blade grip unserviceable if it failed to be within inspection parameters
thus causing disposal action. While this process was not required for all
overhauled grips, its occurrence was frequent enough that it was felt that total
requirements for the process could potentially disrupt the overhaul of aircraft and
result in a significant work backlog.
Additionally, the shot-peening process did not guarantee the grip would
be made serviceable. A small quantity of grips required a level of processing
which rendered the blade grip walls too thin to remain in a serviceable status. As
a result, even after processing, disposal of a small portion of overhauled grips
was necessary.
Unfortunately the ability to perform shot-peening in-house was not
possible. CCAD had to find an outside source to perform the work. The
administrative leadtime to find a source was longer than anticipated. It took
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roughly one year to find a source (out of Houston, Texas) and contract for the
service and an additional 19 months to begin delivery of processed grips. During
this time the parts system ran out of issuable stock. At this point, aircraft that did
not require the process were overhauled and returned to the fleet. Others,
requiring shot-peening, were put back into service as serviceable grips became
available.
In this case, as with case five, a series of unrelated events culminated to
produce a nonavailability situation. The events that contributed to this situation
were, the occurrence of an unplanned requirement to remove corrosion from
main rotor grips, the lack of in-house shop capability to perform the required task,
and the lower level of priority placed on the Huey versus other higher priority
aircraft such as the UH-60 (Blackhawk) and the AH-64 (Apache).
3. Tension Torsion Strap.
The third evaluated component was the tension torsion strap, NSN 1615-
01-063-4016. This item is a component of the main rotor system which dampens
main rotor blade oscillations. This item is a field replacement item and as such
requirements from both the unit and intermediate levels as well as depot level
facilities must be met. The item has a finite life and must be periodically
replaced. The difficulty with this component was the potential lack of a qualified
source of supply as a result of the prime contractor serving notice to the
Government of their intent to discontinue the components manufacture. The
Government has relied on this single source of supply for quite a few years and
had made no provisions, at the time of notice, to identify another component
source. Another interesting twist was that this original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) had qualified himself as a source of supply at his own expense.
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What caused this notice of intent to be served? The company had
recently come under new management and had made a fundamental business
decision to discontinue the manufacturer of the tension torsion strap and to
refocus its work effort. At the time the notice was served, there appeared to be
an adequate number of items on-hand, stocked at various locations at depots
and in the field, to meet near term requirements. As of 23 October 1992, there
were 3000 components on-hand. Since the notice, no additional orders for
tension torsion straps have been placed. Although quantities on-hand were
adequate to provide for short term needs, the potential existed for the exhausting
of stocked supplies in the out years resulting in a nonavailability issue. As with
most other rotor system components, lack of a qualified source of supply would
lead to the grounding of aircraft as the requirement to replace these items
occurred. Unlike other components evaluated, this situation had little or no
immediate effect on the aircraft fleet and provided an opportunity to aggressively
pursue corrective actions.
The only option available to correct this deficiency was to find and qualify
another source of supply, a process that is not as simple as it sounds. After a
considerable period of time, the Government was able to accomplish this task.
Much to the dismay of the Government, about this same time, the OEM
expressed a desire to reenter the market and again supply the component, a
complete reversal in the stance expressed in its earlier notice of intent. This
resulted in the need to compete the requirement, further adding to the time
necessary to resolve the nonavailability issue. Administrative and manufacturing
lead times were now a critical part of the acquisition.
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As of the time of this research, ATCOM was still in the process of
resolving the issue. One of the key points to be taken away from this scenario is
that there are positive aspects of having more than one identified and qualified
source of supply for components. Relying on a single source, regardless of the
economies of scale realized through economical order quantities, can prove to be
a serious planning shortfall when a prime contractor makes a business decision
which impacts on component availability. The benefits of single sourcing from
the OEM or breaking out the requirement to more than one source must be
closely examined during acquisition planning and sourcing decisions.
As a result of nonavailability issues, the Army, as part of their Spare
Parts Reform Program, came out with the Spare Parts Review Initiatives
(SPRINT). These initiatives sought to streamline the acquisition process, focus
more attention and planning on spare parts procurement, and help ensure the
availability of spares (Appendix C). SPRINT initiative 3: Implement Defense
Acquisition Supplement No. 6 "Breakout", and initiative No. 4: Eliminate
disincentives on industry to breakout, specifically address the nonavailability
issue raised by the inadequate number of sources of supply for the Huey's
tension torsion strap.
4. Universal Control Lever.
The fourth evaluated component was the universal control lever, NSN
1615-00-829-6855. This item is a component of the main rotor control system.
After looking at four hard-to-acquire components, all of which are from or
associated with the main rotor system, a trend seems to appear.
The problem with this component arose out of the small business (SB)
portion of the contract. In order to comply with small business and small
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disadvantaged business (SDB) goals, certain portions of work on noncompetitive
procurements were set-aside for these businesses. In compliance with these
goals, half of this contract was awarded to a small business.
What eventually led to a nonavailability issue was poor quality control on
the part of the small business. As part of the manufacturing process, the
universal control levers have to be baked (heat treated) at a predetermined
temperature and for a predetermined time. This procedure, if done properly,
eliminates the possibility of hydrogen impregnation of the metal, otherwise known
as hydrogen imbrittlement. If the procedure is not performed properly, the metal
becomes impregnated with hydrogen, becomes brittle and is easily fatigued
under rotor system operating conditions. At some point, which can not be
determined, the component would fail.
The second problem with hydrogen imbrittlement is that it is not
detectable until it occurs or is found during inspection (most likely during daily,
preflight or post flight inspections). In this situation, the imbrittlement was not
discovered until the items were received and shipped out worldwide. It was
ultimately discovered by personnel in the field after several component failures.
After investigating these failures, it was determined that only one or two lots were
found to be defective, all from the same vendor.
How did this lack of quality control occur? The vendor in question had
historically provided quality products to the Government. With this fact in mind,
no preaward survey had been conducted to confirm the vendor's capability to
perform the work. After the situation developed, the Government provided the
contractor an opportunity to correct it's deficiencies but they were unable to do so
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to the Government's satisfaction. Subsequently, another vendor was located and
awarded the contract.
From the time the hydrogen imbrittlement was discovered up through the
time another vendor was located and awarded the contract, backlogs totaling
5000 + components piled up. The universal control lever is a heavy use
component, with requirements totaling 55 - 60 per month. At an average high of
60 per month this could have worked out to a backlog of approximately 83.3
months if the contract had not been split. Situations such as this lend strong
support to the idea of the multiple sourcing of requirements. Because of the use
of two vendors, the backlog, although still large, was made more manageable.
5. Straight Headless Pin.
The fifth, and last, evaluated component was the straight headless pin -
main rotor system, NSN 5315-00-834-1418. These pins hold the tension torsion
straps in place on the main rotor hub. There are four on each hub, with two going
to each tension torsion strap.
As will be seen, this scenario, like the previously discussed main rotor
grip, developed as a result of the cumulative affect of unrelated events that all
occurred in close proximity to each other. There were three separate events that
led to the resulting issue. First, the contractor manufacturing the component
went out of business. This forced the Government to acquire another source of
supply to meet requirements for the item. Second, the item was declared a finite
life item, drastically changing the quantity requirements for the component. Up to
that point, they had been replaced if and when it was declared out of tolerance
during the overhaul of the aircraft. With the new requirement, they were
changed regardless of condition at a predetermined, tracked time interval. The
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third, less serious factor, the requirement to place serial numbers on the pin,
necessary for tracking of finite items, also caused some delay. This delay,
however, ran more or less concurrently with the first two factors.
The straight headless pin was a field replacement item with requirements
coming from all maintenance levels. During the resolution process, backorders
totaling into the thousands were accumulated. Total monthly requirements for
the pin averaged 150 - 160 items. After a new contractor was located, qualified
and awarded new replacement items began to enter the system and began
working off the backlog.
The finite item requirement was addressed as follows. Non-serial
numbered items that were already stocked but not installed (condition code A) on
aircraft were etched, with an allocated serial number, at the level they were
stocked at and were tracked from that point as new stock. Items installed on
aircraft were given an arbitrary remaining life figure and tracked from that point.
The arbitrary time applied to all pins within category regardless of the actual time
of use. New components coming out of production were stamped, on the pin
head, by the manufacturer.
D. CURRENT DOD SPARE PARTS PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of two innovative
procurement methods, whose purpose is to provide for the continuous
sustainment of spare parts (spares) throughout a system's life cycle. The two
methods identified, focus on different phases of the procurement process to
achieve their intended result. They also both offer practical solutions to the
problem of spares nonavailability.
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The remainder of this section will consist of: the development of background
information relevant to the subject (showing the critical role spares play in the
overall acquisition process), the discussion of a typical life cycle scenario, the
discussion of the Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) and the
Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) procurement methods (listing
their advantages and disadvantages), and lastly an assessment of the best use
of these methods and a determination of their effectiveness.
1 . Background.
Spares traditionally comprise the largest portion of overall fiscal year
procurement expenditures. A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report on
Air Force spare parts showed that 62 percent of Fiscal Year 1988 procurement
expenditures were utilized to procure spare parts [Ref 27 : p. 1 1].Once systems
go into full scale production and are deployed to units in the field, the criticality of
spares availability increases. Availability is also critical prior to fielding, because a
viable logistics support base must be in place to sustain the system once it is
initially put into service.
Life cycles of technology, and subsequently the systems we procure, are
other key elements to consider when looking at questions such as when and how
to procure spares. The life cycles of technology and military equipment
contributes additional complexity to the diminishing military spares (DMS)
problem. The acquisition process alone runs from 8-12 years for many weapon
systems. However, technology is improving so rapidly that the typical advanced
component stays out front for less than five years, creating a likelihood that there
may be a nonavailability problem by the end of the acquisition cycle [Ref 19 : p.
11].
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2. Typical Life Cycle.
As the life cycles of technology and systems peak and begin their
decline, the issue of spares availability is virtually guaranteed to become a more
pressing consideration in the sustainment process. Figure 3.1, below, illustrates
the typical life cycle of a new technology and the associated disparity between
















Figure 3.1 Life Cycle of a Technology
As Figure 3.1 indicates, as technological changes occur, the total
requirement for old technology and systems is greatly diminished. In several
cases the Government is the only customer for such items, due to the length of
time the equipment is retained in inventory (e.g. the Army UH-1 helicopter has
been in the inventory since 1959, in one model or another). From an economic
standpoint, it is hard to persuade industry to maintain sources of supply for
critically needed spares when two of their primary motives for being in a
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particular industry, profit and return on investment, are seriously impacted due to
industry-wide trends. The competitive nature of the market place demands that a
company's resources be directed towards more lucrative, newer technologies.
With the declining defense budget, a large number of prime contractors and even
a larger share of subcontractors are concentrating on the commercial market to
maintain an overall increased market share. It is apparent that this trend is
making it increasingly more difficult for the Government to influence or direct
technology, as it has done in the past to some degree.
3. Procurement Methods.
This section will address two innovative procurement methods which can
be utilized to help ensure the availability of spares during a weapon system's life
cycle. The two methods addressed are Spares Acquisition Integrated with
Production (SAIP) and Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP). These
methods are utilized during separate phases of the acquisition process and each
requires adequate and accurate prior planning to ensure its effective and efficient
utilization. The SAIP program will be addressed first, followed by the RAMP
program.
a. Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production.
Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production was first developed by
McDonnell Douglas Corporation [Ref 28 : p. 3]. It came about as an attempt to
realize the monetary benefits of manufacturing parts utilizing economies of scale.
The Air Force subsequently began utilizing the procedure, though Inot as
effectively, in its procurements of the F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. Its later
procurement of the A-10 proved to be more satisfactory than its previous
applications, due to more adequate planning and a more thorough understanding
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of the underlying SAIP principles [Ret 28 : p. 2-4]. The SAIP program is a
concept designed for acquiring initial and follow-on (replenishment) spare parts to
support DOD weapon systems at the least cost to the Government. It is a pre-
nonavailability tool. Conceptually, SAIP holds down the cost of spares by
avoiding the expense associated with separate material orders. Spares costs can
be reduced if separate set up and acceptance/test procedures can be avoided by
the contractor [Ref 29 : p. 4].
There are five principles which are essential to the successful
implementation of the program. These principles are:
1
.
The concurrent ordering and release of initial spares with installed orders.
2. The use of firm fixed-price contracts or Not To Exceed (NTE) pricing.
3. The initial spares must meet current configuration requirements of the
aircraft.
4. The use of firm order quantities.
5. The application of the procedure to new production programs
estimated to cost $300 million or more and any new modification
program estimated to cost $100 million or more which requires initial
spares support [Ref 28 : p. 1-2].
In applying the SAIP program one of the biggest concerns is the
possibility of component obsolescence. In order to preclude procuring a large
number of such items, the single most important factor is the "Stability of design"
of the required item. With the primary objective of the SAIP program being cost
reduction, such risk analysis and management is critical so as not to nullify the
possible benefits derived from the program. An option to minimize the possible
cost of obsolescence is the inclusion of a contractual clause, such as the one
utilized by the Air Force in the procurement of its A-7 spares. This clause
required that approved Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) be incorporated
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into both production and initial provisioning spares; if not the spares would be
declared defective [Ref 29 : p. 9]. A clause of this type could be used when a
component's design stability was in question and the use of the SAIP program
was highly favored. Prior to including such a clause, one must carefully consider
the possible negative effects such a course of action might have on a contractor's
willingness to come forward with contractor proposed ECPs [Ref 30].
According to the Air Force, when properly applied, the SAIP program
offers advantages to both the contractor and the Government. These advantages
are as follows:
Contractor advantages : [Ref 28 : p. 5]
1. Reduced cost through the use of economies of scale with its
subcontractors.
2. Reduced number of production starts and retooling/setup requirements
and their associated costs.
3. Consolidation of orders to allow for more efficient production planning.
Government advantages:[Ref 29 : p. 10]
,
[Ref 28 : p. 5]*
1. Reduced acquisition cost.*
2. Timely delivery of properly configured spares.*
3. Reduction of Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) rates and increased
unit readiness rates.*
4. Reduced requirement for contractual monitoring, measurement, and
negotiation.*
5. Benefits of centralized procurement.*
6. Reduction of risk through the use of firm fixed-price contracts.
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It is easy to see that, when properly utilized, the SAIP program is
highly advantageous to all parties involved. However, its use requires the
cooperative efforts of industry and the Government. Buying spares in advance of
need and in larger quantities than demand indicates, requires a carefully
calculated requirements determination. The Government makes this call based
on contractor input, in-house assessments, and historical data on like or like-type
components.
Finally, consideration must also be given to the number of
components to fall into this category of procurement.
Ideally, the SAIP items selected should comprise only from 10-15 percent
of the total initial spares, but should represent a large share of the initial
spares investment (from 65 - 75 percent). This provides intensive
management of the most significant cost-driving spares [Ref 29 : p. 12].
b. Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts.
The second program to be examined is the Rapid Acquisition of
Manufactured Parts (RAMP) program. It is a maturing Navy-funded Research
and Development (R&D) program whose primary objectives are the reduction in
cost and shortening of lead times for selected hard-to-acquire parts and
assemblies. The Navy's RAMP Strategic Implementation Plan gives a further
explanation of the program.
In the narrowest sense, it is a self-contained machine shop enterprise, run
by software, which can produce on demand from prepositioned raw
materials and digital parts data. In the broadest sense, RAMP is a group of
concepts: flexible manufacturing; globally linked and integrated data bases;
paperless logistics channels; and alliances of manufacturers and customers
[Ref 31 : p. 8].
The RAMP program implementation has been organized into three
phases. Phase one (1986-1993) consists of proving that RAMP related
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technology can be used to manufacture hard-to-acquire parts. Phase two (1992-
1995) consists of a technology transfer within the Navy and DOD. Phase three
(1993-2010) consists of a technology transfer to industry. Movement from one
phase to the next is predicated upon a positive cost/benefit analysis of the
previous phase.
Unlike SAIP, which is a pre-nonavailability management tool, RAMP
focuses on post nonavailability issues. It comes into play once a requirement is
identified that demands a reduced lead time.
RAMP uses part specifications in computer readable format in a computer
integrated manufacturing (CIM) and a flexible manufacturing system (FMS)
environment to produce a wide variety of high-quality, low-cost parts with
lead times which are about one tenth as long as current procurement
channels [Ref 32 : p. 3].
In addition to the reduced cost and shortened lead times, RAMP is
anticipated to also improve unit readiness, integrate advanced computer
technology into the Navy, establish procedures and capabilities to communicate
requirements and specifications to automated manufacturing facilities, lead to the
installation of FMS cells in the Navy industrial activities and to reduce the Navy's
wholesale spare parts inventory level.
In order for RAMP to achieve these goals, several critical elements
must exist. First, part specifications in computer readable format must be
available, able to be updated and transferable.
Most existing parts technical and engineering data is in two dimensional (2-
D) paper drawing format. For RAMP to function properly, three dimensional
digital product model data must be provided to the Navy by its contractors
[Ref 27: p. 15].
Second, adequate economic incentives must be available for industry
to gain their support. Incentives such as commercial applicability (spin-off) of
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developing FMS facilities, the value of Government technology transfer and
sustained use of established FMS facilities. Last, CIM/FMS facilities must be
available to perform the required manufacturing tasks.fRef 33]
FMS, while a departure from the normal manufacturing process, is the wave
of the future for batch manufacturing. It is particularly well-suited to medium
and small batch manufacturing, the production of lot sizes usually
associated with defense industries [Ref 33 : p. 20].
In the current environment of reduced budgets and force drawdowns,
the need for ensuring the availability of spares to maintain force readiness will
become more and more critical. Continued modernization efforts will shift the
focus (e.g. budget) from older systems and further complicate their sustainment.
Innovative procurement techniques which provide an economic advantage while
maintaining product quality will be of particular interest.
The Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) program,
as a pre-nonavailability management tool, offers distinct advantages in weapon
system sustainment. This program has been found to be extremely effective in
meeting its goals of cost reduction, timely delivery, and configuration control. The
key to successful use of the SAIP program is design stability. When a design
stable procurement is made using SAIP there has been, according to research,
no increased incidence of obsolescence as originally feared by its opponents
[Ref 29 : p. 29-30]. By all accounts, SAIP has proven itself to be a viable tool in
spares availability management.
The Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) program, as a
post nonavailability management tool, also offers unique advantages in weapon
systems sustainment. Its ability to rapidly produce small batch, hard-to-acquire
parts at a reduced cost makes it a prime candidate for acquiring short lead time
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requirements. Indicators from initial test sites at Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP)
Cherry Point, Naval Administative Center (NAC) Indianapolis and Naval Shipyard
(NSY) Charleston show that the program is meeting its milestone requirements
as indicated in the RAMP Strategic Implementation Plan [Ref 27 : p. 33].
4. Assessment.
It is the researcher's conclusion, that when properly utilized, both the
SAIP and RAMP programs offer DOD the types of spares management tools
which will help ensure the timely and cost efficient acquisition of spares, which in
turn will help to maintain and/or increase unit mission readiness. Procurement
innovations such as these will become increasingly more critical in our current
operating environment and in the future.
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF NONAVAILABLE COMPONENTS
It is an assertion of the researcher that the ability to proactively preclude the
occurrence of spare parts nonavailability is the best defense against such issues.
In order to facilitate this proactive approach to spares management, the
identification of the salient features (characteristics) of nonavailable components
is necessary. While not all inclusive, the following list provides an identification,
and subsequent discussion, of those features which appear to correspond with
the occurrence of spares nonavailability. This list of characteristics is the result
of an analysis of the researcher's gathered data and personal experience as an
Army aviator and reflect his original thought. Any similarity in thought, to other
researcher efforts on the subject, is purely coincidental and should serve to
validate prior conclusions drawn by other researchers.
The proposed salient features of nonavailable components, identified through




2. Lack of design stability.
3. Lack of interoperability and commonality.
4. Long lead-times.
5. Finite life criteria.
6. Time in the inventory/level of technology.
While these salient characteristics do not apply to every nonavailability
occurrence, their frequent appearance seems to indicate a pattern which could
be used to identify and target possible future areas of concern in spares
availability.
1. Technical Complexity
Unfortunately for the material manager, contracting personnel, and
others charged with maintaining spares availability, most aviation components,
by nature, are more technically complex than other systems (e.g., ground
vehicles) [Ref 3]. Examples of this complexity are: the tightened tolerances
placed on bearings in the main rotor system due to vibration and balance
requirements and the increased tensile strength requirements for bolts in the
main rotor head assemblies due to the forces/stresses placed on the main rotor
system during normal operating conditions. The point to be made here is that
technical complexity equates to time. Long periods of time are generally required
to resolve nonavailability issues for technically complex items. The more
technically complex an item is, the harder it is to manufacture and the harder it is
to procure. As a simplistic example: it would be considerably easier to acquire a
washer for a starter bolt of a jeep than it would be to acquire a washer for
virtually any component of a helicopter's main rotor system. The engineering
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requirements placed on these two components are simply not the same and are
based on different operating conditions and configurations. Technical complexity
not only addresses the issue of time but also that of cost. Entering an era of
declining budgets is sure to pose challenges in sustainment, particularly in the
area of unforecasted spares requirements resulting from such things as aircraft
modernization and safety of flight issues. Simply stated, technically complex
components require more thorough planning to ensure continuous availability.
2. Lack of design stability
Components that are not design stable or are pushing the state of the art
tend to generate more changes than do design stable components [Ref 30].
Changes, if not planned for, can easily result in component nonavailability. Lack
of design stability introduces an element of risk into the procurement of any
system or its components. The probability of change, and increased risk, is
greatly enhanced as the design is refined. Conversely, as the design is refined,
design stability is built into the component. In some respects design refinement is
a double edged sword. While generating initial changes, it most often results in
stability over time. Almost any aircraft platform that has been in the inventory for
any number of years has gone through several model changes. These upgrades
are generally a result of technical advances allowing the design to be refined to
better meet evolving mission requirements. [Ref 30]
3. Lack of interoperability and commonality
The researcher sees lack of interoperability and commonality as major
shortfalls in our past integrated logistics support (ILS) planning. While overall
aircraft design differences are a fundamental function of differing mission needs,
interoperability and commonality of components appears to have only been given
52
a cursory look. An example where commonality was incorporated into aircraft
design was the hydraulic pump system for the UH-60 Blackhawk, utility
helicopter. On this aircraft, its three hydraulic pumps, the number 1, 2, and
backup hydraulic pumps, are all interchangeable. This flexibility was designed
into the system allowing the positioning of the pump in any one of three separate
locations. The lack of such commonality in design would require the
procurement and implied availability of three separate hydraulic pumps to replace
what one could do through innovative design.
Interoperability and commonality not only enhance the chances of
component availability, due to fewer required separate components, it also allows
the ordering of components in more economical order quantities, reducing the
overall life cycle cost of an end item. [Ref 30]
4. Long lead-times
As was illustrated by the component case analysis of the Huey utility
helicopter, every component, regardless of the circumstances originally leading
to nonavailability, ended in a long lead-time situation. This has two root causes.
The first is the cumbersome procurement process and the failure to prequalify
alternate sources of supply. If a single source of supply is used to provide an
item and that source, for whatever reason, is unable or unwilling to continue to do
so, the burden of acquiring another source of supply falls to the Government. If
no other sources are known, the process of soliciting, locating and qualifying a
source(s) of supply begins. As a general rule of thumb, from historical
experience, this takes approximately 18 months [Ref 34]. During this time, if
sufficient stocks of supply are not already on-hand, serious shortfalls in
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availability can occur. This has a severe impact on unit mission readiness for the
affected system.
The second cause is the time required after contract award to attain a
sustained operating rate at full production. The ability to attain this level of work
is directly related to the manufacturer's past experience in the field. If he/she has
manufactured like items, the time required to achieve full production is greatly
reduced, as the learning curve rapidly shallows out in slope. The less
experienced manufacturer will require additional time to meet production goals.
Once production begins, the task of working off the backlog of orders for
parts begins. The nonavailability issue is not resolved until all backorders are
filled, adequate replenishment stocks are on-hand to meet estimated demand
and a source of supply is available and contracted with to continue the production
of spares.
5. Finite life criteria
An item has a finite life when it must be replaced at a predetermined time
regardless of its materiel condition at that time. In the case of aviation
components, finite life is measured in hours logged on a particular component
from the time of its installation on the airframe.
Finite life component criteria is not a serious problem, if it is planned for.
The problem arises when a component that has traditionally not been a finite life
item, has that criterion placed on it as a result of changing replacement
requirements. An example of this situation was the straight headless pin - main
rotor system component case discussed earlier in this chapter. Declaring a
component a finite life item drastically increased the replacement requirements
for the component. As an illustration, an item that might have lasted 500 hours
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before its replacement was required might now be manditorily switched out at
250 hours.
The first two questions to ask in this situation are: does the manufacturer
have the plant capacity to increase production to meet the new demand? and
does the manufacturer desire to increase its level of work? If the answer to either
of these questions is no, the Government is again facing an eventual
nonavailability issue. The Government will either have to incentivize the
manufacturer to invest in plant and equipment to meet the increased demand or
will have to acquire another source of supply.
6. Time in the inventory/level of technology
As a generalization, the longer a system is in the inventory, the more
likely it or its components will face nonavailability. This issue, basically that of a
system life cycle, was previously discussed in Section D of this chapter. The
point was made that as military equipment, of a given technical level, is retained
in the inventory, the use of that technology in the commercial market will probably
decline because new technology is being introduced. The commercial market
traditionally cycles through technology quicker than the military. As a result, the
military ultimately becomes the principal user of that technology. Unless a
manufacturer is primarily a producer of military equipment, or is incentivized to
continue production, the likelihood of diminishing sources of supply for
technologically obsolete equipment is greatly enhanced. This is a stage of the
system's life cycle when component obsolescence can become an overwhelming
burden.
At the risk of sounding repetitive, the current environment we operate in
and the forces shaping that environment, will have an impact on manufacturers'
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decisions to stay in or divest themselves of interest in the defense industrial
base. Also, as the defense budget continues to get "nickeled and dimed" to meet
domestic and entitlement programs, the incentives for manufacturers to remain
business partners with the Government will likewise diminish.
Another point is that as systems remain in the inventory, the focus of
resources shifts to newer systems, either modernized systems (e.g., OH-58D
observation helicopter) or new entries (e.g., AH-64A attack helicopter). This shift
in resource allocation impacts areas such as authorized funding, personnel, and
priority of work effort. Admittedly, this shift in focus is logical and is to be
expected considering our current level of resourcing. Available resources,
through careful planning, must be put to their best use in order to provide the
necessary level of support required until such time as the system is eliminated or
retired from the inventory.
F. TOTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Total risk assessment and management is a critical element of any
acquisition and should be incorporated into all phases of planning [Ref 30]. The
value and necessity of initiating these actions early in the acquisition planning
can not be overemphasized. The assessment and management of risk is an
evolutionary process that changes focus as the procurement environment also
undergoes change. It is not simply an initial assessment that, once acted on,
remains unchanged throughout the life of the acquisition.
Risk management includes an analysis of tradeoffs between cost and
benefit, particularly during periods of constrained resources. The optimization of
resources is a key issue in program support (e.g., sustainability). For example, if
the last 5% of something were to account for 90% of the cost of an item, that last
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5% would more than likely be judged as not being cost effective or worth the cost
risk involved, unless it was critical to achieving the stated requirement. This is
the same type of thought process involved with spares management. Trade-offs
must be made to provide the necessary type and level of support required (e.g.,
does the additional surety of maintaining spares availability by having two
sources of supply for a critical component outweigh the cost increase in not being
able to order in more economical order quantities from one vendor?).
As stated earlier, risk is assessed at various stages of the acquisition
process and by various means. As a part of risk management, in the area of
major weapon systems acquisition, the Integrated Program Summary is prepared
by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) to facilitate acquisition milestone
decisions [Ref 35 : p. 4-1]. A portion of this summary is devoted to an
affordability assessment of the support requirements of the acquisition, to include
the procurement of spares [Ref 30]. Affordability is assessed at each Milestone
Decision Point (MSDP) beginning with Milestone I [Ref 36 : p. 4-D-1].
Risk is also addressed throughout the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
planning process. The policies and procedures outlining ILS ensure:
1
.
Support considerations are effectively integrated into the system design;
and
2. Required support structure elements are acquired concurrently with the
system so that the system will be both supportable and supported when
fielded [Ref 36 : p. 7-A- 1].
As part of ILS planning, the use of the SAIP program is integrated into the
procurement when determined to be cost-effective. SAIP, addressed earlier in
the chapter, is one of the Government's pre-nonavailability management tools.
Support risk, when properly assessed and managed, can be minimized to avoid
or offset the effects of spares nonavailability (e.g., the use of SAIP). The
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cooperative efforts of the Government and its contractors are required to achieve
these ends.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the reader with a presentation and analysis of
research findings. This was achieved by presenting the reader with the data
gathered during archival research, personal and telephonic interviews, a mailed
questionnaire, and selected component case analyses. During research, two
current DOD spare parts procurement programs were found to be applicable to
this study and were also presented in the discussion.
As the chapter transitioned from the presentation of findings to an analysis of
findings, several areas of interest were developed. As research was conducted, a
list of the salient characteristics of nonavailable components was developed. It
was shown that an understanding of these characteristics could serve as a useful
tool in the proactive prevention of spares nonavailability. If not prevented, this
method of analysis could lessen the severity of nonavailability issues by allowing
a reasonable projection of their occurrence.
The last area discussed in the chapter was total risk assessment and
management. As a part of total program performance, the importance of risk
management can not be overstated. Thorough risk management can prevent
crisis management. However, all too often, nonavailability issues fall into the
latter category. It was also pointed out that risk management is an evolutionary
process in that it is reevaluated and changed, when necessary, throughout the
course of the procurement.
The following chapter, alternative actions, will discuss those actions which
procurement personnel can take, at various stages of the acquisition process, to
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help preclude or respond to the occurrence of spare parts nonavailability. These
stages are broken down into pre-nonavailability actions, post nonavailability
actions, and generalized actions.
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IV. SPARES IMPEDIMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS
A. SPARES IMPEDIMENTS
After a thorough examination of the research data, it was evident that a
myriad of impediments to spares availability existed. Some of these impediments
were found to be controllable while others were found to be outside direct control.
The latter were generally circumstances driven by prevailing global economic and
political factors.
Impediments were categorized, by the researcher, as either pre-
nonavailability or post nonavailability issues. Resolution of these issues was
further categorized as the responsibility of the Government, its contractors or
outside either parties' control.
The sheer volume of possible factors contributing to spare parts
nonavailability is enormous. The procurement environment is so complex and
dynamic that preparing for all possible eventualities is an ominous task. The
following lists of pre- and post nonavailability impediments, identified as a result
of interview and questionnaire responses, are representative of the challenges
facing the acquisition community.
1. Pre-nonavailability Impediments
The researcher has defined pre-nonavailability impediments as those
which can be either partially or completely controlled during the acquisition
process up to the point of contract award. Those impediments identified as pre-
nonavailability issues are listed below and are accompanied with an analysis of
their relationship to the issue, which shows how they tie into the research effort.
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While these impediments were identified during research on aviation spares




Poorly structured contract elements.
2. Poor Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning.
3. Faulty source selection process.
4. Quality of the workforce.
5. Faulty specifications.
6. Lack of coordination among interagency departments.
7. Disconnect between funding and what demand history supports.
8. Maintaining tooling for older systems.
9. Obtaining current Technical Data Packages (TDPs) for breakout.
10. Factors shaping the procurement environment.
11. Politics.
12. The cumbersome procurement process.
13. Requirement for competition.
The thirteen pre-nonavailability impediments, listed above, are all
controllable by the Government with the possible exception of number ten. This
impediment is outside the area of reasonable control of those individuals
normally responsible for ensuring the effective and efficient operation of the
procurement system. It is also outside the reasonable control of industry.
a. Poorly structured contract elements
This issue was raised by both questionnaire and interview
respondents. It was also emphasized on several occasions during archival
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research. The vast majority of respondents expressed a concern over the need
for current, accurate, and complete TDPs, This area was not addressed during
component case analysis.
Poorly structured contracts (e.g., lack of appropriate clauses) can be
a significant contributor to nonavailability. As an example, the use of clauses in
contracts are a way for the Government to mitigate risk. Clauses such as options
to extend production, options for additional spares, rights to technical data
packages (TDPs) and liquidated damages all assist the Government in managing
this risk and help to ensure spares availability. The cost of acquiring these
options and rights can be significantly increased, if not made impractical, after the
fact. Responsibility for ensuring the proper structuring of contracts rests with the
contracting officer after coordination with all contributing/affected agencies.
b. Poor Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning
This issue was raised during component case analysis, specifically
on the UH-1 main rotor yoke. It was also emphasized during several telephone
interviews. ILS planning is the cornerstone of spares availability. Failure to
properly plan here can have serious repercussions after contract award.
Thorough ILS planning takes into account all aspects of support required for a
fielded system, to include initial and provisioning spares. ILS planning is a team
effort and as such requires input from all agencies involved in the acquisition of a
given system (TQM approach). One individual can not be expected to perform
this planning in a vacuum; making needs known during planning is paramount.
c. Faulted source selection process
This impediment was addressed in the context of best value
contracting. Respondents argued that their primary difficulty was in the
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evaluation of potential sources of supply. Sources would be identified
,
qualified,
awarded a contract and then fail their First Article Test (FAT), causing significant
delays in delivery. The problem rests with a lack of resources to adequately
oversee and evaluate a vendor's technical capability. Since technical ability can
be a major consideration in best value analysis, an error here could easily lead to
the selection of a source incapable of completing its contractual obligations.
d. Quality of the workforce
This was alluded to on several occasions by respondents during
telephone and personal interviews. Those interviewed were reluctant, due to a
fear of reprisal, to specifically address this issue, but the subject of the quality of
the workforce surfaced in several interviews. Worker apathy towards duty
performance was seen, by the Government, as a result of this impediment. This
was also noted as a contributing factor to nonavailability in the universal control
lever component case analysis. It also appeared to the researcher that
members of the workforce have a fundamental lack of understanding as to what
their role(s) are, could be, and should be in the acquisition process. This process
is a team effort. When one member of the team fails to participate in the
process, critical elements of planning can be left to chance. A quote from a
contracting official stating that, "... we are the tail on the dog, doing what we are
told", is a prime illustration of non -participation in the process. Challenging the
system to ensure adequate performance is much more acceptable.
e. Faulty specifications
This issue was addressed on several occasions during archival
research. Faulty specifications result in an item that is either too difficult to
produce efficiently (over specification) or an item that is not fit for use (under
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specification). Over specification seemed to be the primary concern of those
interviewed. The use of military and design specifications were given as
examples of over specification. Over specification usually resulted in a situation
where the earned value of the degree of over specification does not equal the
cost incurred to meet that specification. Again, not getting the product that is
desired can result in schedule slippage, increased cost, rework, and degraded
readiness.
f. Lack of coordination among interagency departments
This was one of the most commonly addressed impediments during
interviews and with questionnaire respondents. This can result in an incomplete
definition of need or initiation of actions which result in breaks in sustainment.
This could occur, as illustrated by the main rotor yoke component case analysis,
when engineering, without discussing a proposed inspection tolerance change
with material management, arbitrarily initiates the action. Material management
has not programmed in an anticipated increase in the requirement for spares for
the component in question. As a result, safety stocks may not absorb the
increased demand, resulting in spares nonavailability. This scenario is not an
uncommon occurrence. The researcher believes there is a correlation between
this impediment and the quality of the workforce, discussed above.
g. Disconnect between funding and what demand history
supports
This was addressed during two telepnone interviews. Respondents
related that this issue had steadily escalated over the last few years as their
respective budgets had systematically been scaled down. This is currently a
serious area of concern for many agencies. With the decreasing defense budget,
funding shortfalls are more likely to occur. Funding will have to be prioritized and
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allocated to those systems most critical to force readiness (risk management).
This is not a situation that anyone can correct, it is a situation that must be
managed aggressively. Relief will not be realized until this latest dip in the
budget runs its course.
h. Maintaining tooling for older systems
This was addressed during interviews with personnel at the Aviation
and Troop Command (ATCOM) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This
was also addressed in the tension torsion strap component case analysis. The
storage, maintenance and acquisition of tooling for older systems was a recurring
concern. For example, when a sole source subcontractor goes out of business
or discontinues the production of an item, these issues surface. The two areas of
real concern were the cost of replicating unavailable tooling and the time involved
in identifying, qualifying, and receiving components from a new source of supply.
/. Obtaining current TDPs for breakout
This area was addressed by both questionnaire and interview
respondents. Industry expressed a particular concern with this issue. Both
Government and industry recognized that the lack of rights to technical data is a
serious shortcoming as it significantly increases administrative acquisition times.
This is both a pre- and post nonavailability issue. Future demands
may dictate the breakout of components to additional manufacturers. This either
can not be accomplished due to the proprietary nature of the required data or the
cost of acquiring these data after contract award. Industry, in questionnaire
responses, stressed the importance of procuring sustaining effort for the
Provisioning Master Record (PMR) which would accommodate such future
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needs. They also pointed out that the Government generally elects not to
procure this effort.
j. factors shaping the procurement environment
This area was addressed most frequently in archival research.
Several respondents did, however, address the issues of the declining defense
base and the military force drawdown.
This is both a pre- and post nonavailability issue. These are factors
which are influenced by the overall economic and political environment. Their
impact on the economy, in general, and their impact on the defense industrial
base and all its participants, specifically, is significant. These factors include: the
requirement for competition, the use of best value contracting, the
implementation of modernization initiatives, the declining defense base, and the
military force drawdown. These factors are more easily addressed and managed
at the Federal Government level. All of these factors affect DOD's ability to
ensure spares availability and can affect out-year sustainment over a prolonged
period.
k. Politics
This was addressed by two respondents as a frequent distracter in
the completion of their assigned duties. This is both a pre- and post
nonavailability issue.
Political gamesmanship is recognizable at all levels of virtually any
organization. It impedes the procurement process when what is required to be
done by regulation is subordinated to what will ensure the status quo (e.g., job
security, paying back obligations). An ingrained atmosphere is pervasive and
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directly impacts the efficient functioning of the procurement process. This was a
sensitive issue for those interviewed.
/. The cumbersome procurement process
This area was addressed during several telephone and personal
interviews. Its impact was felt the most in trying to resolve short-fused
unforecasted requirements. This was also addressed in every component case
analysis, and in archival research.
The point most often alluded to here was the time requirements
dictated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) make the timely execution
of acquisitions virtually impossible. For example, the administrative lead time
required to identify, qualify, and contract with a new source of supply could take
18-24 months to accomplish. The fact is painfully obvious that this is not
satisfactory in regard to short-fused support requirements. The procurement
system is so convoluted and difficult to navigate, that efficiency is seriously
hampered from the offset. Many Small Business (SB) and Small Disadvantaged
Business (SDB) concerns can not operate in this environment.
m. Requirement for competition
This was addressed during personal interviews. The respondents'
concern was that the procurement environment had changed enough over the
last few years that the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) required updating to
be more responsive to these new circumstances.
When originally enacted in 1984, CICA, was needed to enhance the
procurement process. There are serious differences between 1984 and 1992.
The world order has changed, the threat has changed, the defense base is going
through a fundamental change and budgets are in decline and the difficulty of
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maintaining a competitive environment grows. The question becomes, can we
(the Government) continue to promote and support effective competition in the
current environment? Data indicate that some modification to the requirement
might be necessary to maintain its integrity and usefulness.
2. Post Nonavailability Impediments
Post nonavailability impediments are defined as those which occur after
contract award
,
during the actual administration of the contract, through contract
termination and close-out. Those impediments identified as post nonavailability
issues are listed below and are accompanied by a brief analysis of their









7. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and other agency requirements.
8. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Consumable Item Transfer (CIT).
9. Quality assurance at the vendor level.
10. Sole source procurements.
1 1
.
Vendors going into bankruptcy.
12. Mixed Service requirements.
13. SB/SDB inability to perform.
14. Economic infeasibility of sustainment.
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The following analysis will include a brief discussion of each
impediment, state whether it is controllable or uncontrollable and by whom and
address how itties into the research effort (e.g., how it relates to reviewed
literature, interviews, and component case analysis). Unlike pre-nonavailability
issues which can usually be controlled by the Government, some post
nonavailability can be influenced by the Government, its contractors or in some
instances both parties.
a. Inaccurate demand history
This issue was raised by a questionnaire respondent. The
respondent's impression was that, in most cases, demand history is distorted out
of an ignorance of the impact of such actions on the requisitioning process. End
users simply do not understand how the system works. This impediment is
controllable, to a large degree, by the end user level.
Demand history can be distorted by ordering in bulk, hoarding stocks
at unit level and other means of circumventing the system which cause stocks of
supply to be inadequate to meet true demand. Also, failure to consolidate
requirements among Services and agencies denies economical ordering and
also distorts the true cyclical nature of many requirements. During ILS planning,
the use of inaccurate demand history from a like system, to use as a basis for
provisioning, can cause problems to migrate to that system causing additional
nonavailability issues.
b. OEM out of business or production
This was discussed by virtually every respondent as a significant
cause of spares nonavailability. It is controllable, to a large extent, by all parties
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participating in the acquisition process, through the proactive management of
programs.
Situations in which this occurs are not all that uncommon for older
fielded systems. The lack of availability of components due to this circumstance
are some of the most problematic and time consuming to resolve, according to
those interviewed. In a lot of cases the lack of availability is not realized until a
requirement hits the system, effectively stifling the proactive management of such
a shortfall.
c. Delinquent deliveries
As with item b above, this was another common issue raised by
respondents. It was noted that industry did not discuss this issue, nor was it
found in literature (e.g., trade journals and industry magazines). This issue was
also discussed in the universal control lever component case analysis.
Delinquent deliveries have their own myriad of reasons for
occurrence. The consistent result of delinquency is program schedule slippage
and possible degraded unit mission readiness. This impediment is controllable at
the vendor level.
d. Obsolescence
This was addressed by respondents from DLA. They felt that this
was by far the hardest type of nonavailability to resolve. ATCOM respondents
stated their position was that they did not deal in obsolete items. Unfortunately
this is a largely uncontrollable situation. As technology advances, older systems
become obsolete.
This generally involves the development of a new source as most
OEMs are not in the business of producing obsolete components or systems.
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Availability of current technical data, a qualified source with available capacity
and necessary tooling are but a few of the considerations necessary to acquire
these components. According to the respondents, these are, with rare exception,
extremely long lead time items.
e. Unforecasted requirements
This was a hot issue with the ATCOM, material management division.
From what the researcher observed, reacting to unforeseen events (crisis
management) was a major element of the work they performed. Its affects were
also seen in every component case analysis.
Examples of causes of increased unforecasted requirements include
inaccurate usage, inaccurate forecasts, safety of flight messages, finite life
designations, and changed (tightened) inspection criteria. Any or all of these can
combine to invalidate prior forecasts. As with most other nonavailability issues,
time is a factor. One of two things must occur to meet this increased demand.
Either the capacity to meet this new requirement must be obtained, or the usage
of the component must be reduced to coincide with availability. The latter is
usually not the case, as established or required Operational Tempo's
(OPTEMPOs) are not easily altered as they affect a host of other Service's
agencies. This can be controlled, to some extent, by all parties involved in the
procurement process through proactive program management and the
coordination of efforts.
f. Contract changes
This was addressed in archival research and during a graduate
course on contracting for major systems. It is controllable by the Government
and those it contracts with.
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Changes in a system or its components can occur as a result of the
Government requiring the change or as a result of the vendor submitting an
unsolicited Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). Change, for the purpose of this
research, is the material modification or modernization of an item. Any such
change(s) must be carefully evaluated to assess its full impact on availability and
sustainment, prior to its implementation. As a general rule, change rarely results
in the immediate removal of older systems from the inventory. It usually results
in the supplementation of the existing inventory which can lead to the occurrence
of nonavailability for both the old and new systems due to a resulting competition
for scarce resources. Modernization initiatives are usually top priority and usually
force a switch in focus from older systems.
g. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and other agency requirements
This was addressed by two respondents, one from ATCOM and one
from DLA. While recognized by both parties as a necessary requirement, it was
observed by the researcher as an extreme strain on a system with diminishing
resources. This is an impediment that can not be resolved as long as the
requirement to support FMS exists.
This area poses a unique challenge. Due to resource constraints,
FMS customers usually operate older systems. These may or may not still be in
our active inventory. The logistics of supporting older systems or in some cases
obsolete systems has been adequately described previously. It should be clear,
at this point, that two recurring themes are seen in most nonavailability scenarios,
those of cost and time. FMS sales are no different. If anything they require a
larger allocation of both. In our current environment of dwindling resources, FMS
support may become too burdensome to effectively manage.
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h. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Consumable Item Transfer
(CIT)
This issue was raised by both the DLA and the Army. Both parties
were concerned about the smooth transition of spares management from the
separate services to DLA and the potential problems which might arise. The
researcher believes that transition difficulties can be resolved by DLA and the
separate Services through a carefully coordinated effort.
This is an area of concern for both the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) and the separate Services. The DLA fears that the Services will not
requisition the number and types of items that they request be stocked, while the
Services appear to be fearful that DLA does not have the experience in the
Services' individual (historical) management areas to meet their requirements for
spares. Each Service has an established body of knowledge that has effectively
been lost in this transfer of material responsibility. Another concern, expressed
by both parties, is the apparent lack of control each agency has over the other. If
they exist, the tools to administer this new relationship are not well known. One
source characterized the situation as a serious "policy deficiency".
/. Quality assurance at the vendor level
This impediment was illustrated by the universal control lever
component case analysis. This was a prime example of a lack of quality
assurance oversight. According to those interviewed, this impediment is the
direct responsibility of the vendor.
The lack of quality assurance at the vendor level, equates to delivery
of unusable items at the user level. This in turn evolves into a failure to have
necessary stocks of supplies on-hand as originally planned. Poor quality is
particularly detrimental to vendors today. With reduced resources the order of the
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day and an increased use of best value analysis/contracting, poor performance is
not a method to guarantee success. Poor quality assurance almost always
guarantees that-two prime objectives, delivery on time and at or below cost, are
not realized.
j. Sole source procurements
This was a recurring concern in interviews, questionnaires, and
literature. It is the researcher's assertion that this almost ensures disaster and
that the Government has the responsibility for dual sourcing
,
where applicable,
to avoid this impediment. All through this research, case after case, was seen
where sole source procurements led to the eventual loss of a source of supply at
some stage of a system's life cycle. It is to the Government's advantage to have
at least identified, and maybe even qualified, another source of supply for critical
components. The cost, and more importantly, the time delays involved in
completing these actions after the fact are too great. Sole source procurements,
by not ensuring an uninterrupted source of supply, do not facilitate or support
sound supply discipline.
k. Vendors going into bankruptcy
This was addressed in a personal interview, with a member of a
Project Manager's office, as an area of significant current concern. When
combined with the case of sole sourcing, the impact of this event can be
devastating to a program. If such a vendor holds multiple contracts, the case
becomes even more problematic. Does the Government continue to pump
funding to the vendor to shore him/her up or does the Government terminate for
default/convenience? Neither scenario offers the Government much hope of
achieving its original program objectives. With the economy in its current
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downturn, this scenario may become more frequent. This also speaks to the
Government's responsibility of ensuring a thorough preaward survey is
conducted and that a company's financial status is monitored throughout the life
of a contract.
/. Mixed Service requirements
This was addressed by two respondents, one from ATCOM and one
from DLA. It is the responsibility of the Government to manage systems to
maximize commonality and interchangability and to minimize mixed
requirements. Close coordination among using Services can facilitate the
minimization of such requirements.
This situation is characterized by one segment of a fleet of aircraft
(e.g., the Army) using one type of component on its aircraft, while the rest of the
Services use another type of component on its identical aircraft. The
components serve the same purpose, in a lot of cases, but are different in their
configuration and makeup. This divergence from interoperability and
commonality drives up support costs as two components must now be stocked.
Economical order quantities for both may not be realized, and different repair
kits/tools may be required. This also has the affect of doubling the acquisition
requirements and doubling the possibility of nonavailability.
m. SB/SDB inability to perform
This issue was raised by several respondents from ATCOM, each
from different areas of spares responsibility. The inability of these vendors to
perform has the same material affect as with other types of vendors. The
difference is the degree of difficulty required to get these businesses up to an
acceptable level of performance. SB/SDBs operate at a lower capital level than
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larger vendors and normally do not have the assets availability to implement the
necessary changes. The added effort in helping these businesses drains the
already limited Government resources. Failed businesses also impact on the
Government's ability to meet SB/SDB goals, as each loss takes away from an
already small pool of qualified vendors. While ensuring an ability to perform is
primarily a vendor responsibility, the Government can assist through the use of
such programs as the Mentor-Protege program.
n. Economic infeasibility of sustainment
This was addressed by a logistics manager interviewed at ATCOM.
The basic economic feasibility of supporting a system has to be questioned as a
given system reaches the end of its life cycle. At some point in time, a
cost/benefit analysis will show the prudent decision to be one of system
retirement. All systems in the inventory will approach this decision point based
on such things as, cost of sustainment, changes in doctrine, and changes in the
threat. This assessment is not something that can be overlooked. All systems
ultimately have a finite life. It is the Government's responsibility to ensure these
assessments occur proactively.
B. ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS
There are a myriad of actions both the Government and its contractors can
take to ensure spare parts availability. While it is not practical, from an
economics standpoint, or probable, from a realism standpoint, to completely
eliminate nonavailability as an issue, there are certain steps that can be taken to
minimize its occurrence and limit its impact.
Controllability is another part of the puzzle to consider. There are, by their
nature, certain things that can and can not be controlled. The ability to control
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nonavailability is based to a large extent on the degree and quality of the effort
focused on the issue, and the quantity and variety of resources available to
allocate to the task. Some impediments, such as the declining defense base and
the decreasing defense budget, were triggered by events unforeseen by most
and controllable by only a few. Events of this nature and magnitude are outside
the scope of reasonable control for the purpose of this research.
As impediments are grouped into pre-nonavailability and post nonavailability
issues, so are the actions available to facilitate their resolution. In most cases,
pre-nonavailability actions can be thought of as proactive in nature, requiring
insightful planning. Post nonavailability actions are usually reactive in nature and
focus on the minimization of the impact resulting from spares nonavailability.
1. Pre-nonavailability actions.
The first and foremost action that can be taken is to ensure a thorough,
calculated, and coordinated planning effort. Thorough initial ILS planning will
reap its benefits throughout the life of the program. The researcher would
categorize this as the cornerstone of systems sustainment and spares
availability. The benefit received from such an effort will far outweigh the
potential costs of an ill-fated effort. With most major systems remaining in the
inventory several decades, the long term impact of poor planning can be drawn
out over a sustained period.
It is the researcher's opinion that such a planning effort should involve
actions such as; structuring contracts correctly to reflect the clauses required to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the contract, questioning statements of
need and specifications which are vague and ambiguous, ensuring the integrity
of the source selection process, training a quality workforce, demanding
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cooperation and taking the lead in fostering such relationships with all parties
involved in the acquisition process, and minimizing the effects of political
gamesmanship by stressing conformance to regulations and issued guidance.
In addition to those described above, the following actions could also be
taken to facilitate a more innovative approach to spares management.
Presentation of these actions are a result of the researcher's analysis of the pre-
nonavailability impediments discussed in Section A of this chapter.
a. The use of the Spares Acquisition Integrated with
Production (SAIP) program
The use of the SAIP program could be used for design stable, high
cost components as a method of reducing/controlling cost and ensuring
configuration control (accelerates the provisioning process).
b. incorporate the use of standard parts
The incorporation of the use of standard parts in systems, where
applicable would facilitate commonality and interoperability among systems.
c. Use of key characteristics
Matching the key characteristics of spare parts to the manufacturing
process which is best suited to its production would allow for the use of the most
efficient process available to meet the required demand (e.g., the use of flexible
manufacturing for certain components).
d. Spares breakout
The breakout of spares to provide two sources of supply for critical,
hard-to-manufacture components would help preclude a nonavailability situation
from occurring when a sole source of supply can not meet demand. Component
breakout is not necessary, advisable and/or cost effective for all components.
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e. The use of best value contracting
The use of best value contracting helps ensure that the Government
gets the best possible product after considering all relevant factors. Devising a
method of splitting requirements between a proven producer and a qualified best
value candidate further mitigates spares nonavailability.
f. The minimization ofprogram change
The following actions help to minimize change to a design or
modification of a fielded system and provide for a more stable requirements
base. This stabilization can be partially implemented by incentivizing contractors
to minimize change (e.g., program slippage) through the use of such vehicles as
a liquidated damages clause (proactive management), and through coordination
among Services and agencies when change is imminent to minimize its impacts
(e.g., between engineering and material management). The ability to determine
the impact of a change prior to its implementation may help to favorably affect its
outcome.
g. Emphasize the use of cost-reimbursement contracts
Push for the use of cost-reimbursement contracts, in areas which
have traditionally using fixed-price arrangements to provide a profit motive for
contractors to remain a part of the defense industrial base.
h. Use the Navy "Price Fighters"
The use of such organizations as the Navy's "Price Fighters" to
investigate suspect areas where resources may be misutilized due to
overcharging is a valuable resource management tool. In its simplest terms,
cheaper parts equals more parts. These cheaper components can also mean a
redirection of funds to areas that have funding shortfalls.
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Some pre-nonavailability issues require a different approach. The
factors shaping the procurement environment, described in Chapter II, are
examples of such issues. Factors like the impact of modernization, the declining
defense base and the military force drawdown are driven by factors largely
external to the acquisition community. In many cases, measures taken are
limited to gaining the best outcome from an uncontrollable series of events.
Acquisition professionals can contribute to this effort through the innovative use
of available resources.
2. Post nonavailability actions.
As stated previously, these are the actions taken, after the fact, to
minimize the effects of the occurrence of spares nonavailability. It is the
researcher's opinion, that when proactive management fails, these are the types
of steps necessary to reestablish sustained program support. These proposed
actions, as with the pre-nonavailability actions, are a result of the researcher's
analysis of the post nonavailability impediments discussed in Section A of this
chapter.
a. The use of prequalified alternative sources of supply
Alternate sources of supply could be identified prior to their actual
need, as a proactive measure, to offset the effects of nonavailability when it
occurs. These sources should be identified for high cost, high technology
components as a risk management tool.
b. The use of the Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts
(RAMP) program
The use of the RAMP program would facilitate the timely resolution of
nonavailability issues through the use of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS).
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These facilities specialize in the rapid turnaround of critical components (e.g.,
parts-on-demand (POD)).
c. The use of life of type buys
Life of type buys can be used when components are identified as
those nearing an obsolescence status. These buys can be used when a system
is going to be in the inventory for a specified period after the manufacture of
some of their components has been or will be terminated.
d. The use of risk management
As stated previously, such spares management is an iterative
process. It is not conducted initially and then forgotten. After a spares
nonavailability occurrence, continued risk management of that component is
necessary to minimize a recurrence.
e. Make or buy analysis
In an obsolete technology or one with limited continued commercial
use, the in-house production of the item may be the only economically feasible
alternative. This alternative should be assessed prior to selecting another
outside source to complete the required work.
f. The use of Electronic Data Interchange
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) can be used to accelerate the
reacquisition process. The chief complaint in regard to nonavailability is the
administrative time required to resolve the issue. EDI can reduce the time
required to achieve reprocurement by several orders of magnitude.
When taken at their aggregated level, it is clear that most of the actions
required to either proactively manage sustainment or react to its occurrence can
be initiated by virtually any level of the acquisition community. Responsive
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management allows these measures to be addressed at their lowest levels and
takes the necessary actions to implement change, regardless of its origin in the
organization. -
C. SUMMARY
In summary, it is evident to the researcher, after an analysis of available
data, that the responsibility for identifying and reacting to nonavailability issues
rests with the parties involved in the spares procurement process. It is the
researchers contention that, each party must play an active role in spares
management. While pre-nonavailability issues are largely a Government
responsibility, post nonavailability issues offer an opportunity for all parties to
participate in the process. Without proactive participation, the only recourse is
time consuming and costly reactive management. The latter alternative offers
few long term benefits for either the Government or its industrial partners.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
As a result of the research of spare parts nonavailability, the following
conclusions have been drawn. Their sequence does not signify any order of
preference or priority.
1. Nonavailability will increase if not proactively and aggressively
pursued. In our current environment of budget reductions, force drawdowns,
and diminishing sources of supply, the potential for the increased occurrence of
spares nonavailability is a likely scenario. Reactive measures are not what is
required. Proactive measures are necessary to preclude the further decline of
the defense industrial base.
Industry and Government fail to achieve the prevention of production
deficiencies (leading to nonavailability) due to our insistence on mere problem
detection. While more industries are adopting the philosophy of "continuous
improvement" it has not permeated industry and Government to the point where
availability can be significantly assured. Enough examples of the inability to
produce a satisfactory product were noted in research to conclude that this is a
valid point. Instances of poor quality at the end of production indicate a lack of
prevention during the process.
2. The principles of Total Quality Management (TQM) can not be
applied to the procurement process as a complete package in our current
operating environment. For example, our environment allows the shifting of
inspection focus from error detection to error prevention, but does not allow the
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establishment of habitual working relationships with selectively chosen vendors.
Competition, as currently practiced, denies the potential benefits derived from
such relationships. Also the benefits of continuous improvement can only
partially realized due to our requirement to continuously compete new contracts
when a proven producer is available and has the production capacity to produce
under the new contract. Resetting the learning curve with each new contract
does not facilitate continuous process improvement.
3. The causes of spare parts nonavailability are not totally
controllable. Nonavailability is inherent in the procurement process, and can not
be completely eliminated. As alluded to earlier, the procurement process, due to
its complexity and shear volume, lends itself to a certain degree of inefficiency.
As a result, the total elimination of impediments to spares availability is not a
likely prospect. This is, however, not a rationalization of error acceptance, but
rather an acknowledgment of the degree and scope of the problem.
4. Long lead times are inherent due to the technologically complex
nature of most aviation spare parts. As was pointed out in virtually every
example of spare parts nonavailability addressed in this research, long lead times
are a consistent characteristic of technologically complex components. The
process of identifying, qualifying, selecting, and awarding a contract to a vendor
for such a product is a time intensive administrative task. At present, no relief to
this process complexity is in sight.
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) is to restrictive and does not
provide for the adequate protection of critical industries and producers of critical
components. CICA, as it now stands, does not allow the latitude in judgment
required by the contracting officer (CO) to foster long term (habitual) relationships
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with industry. Such latitude would allow the CO to better ensure the continued
supportability of spares by developing contractual vehicles unrestrained by the
current provisions of CICA. Competition still has its place and still needs to be
the norm in areas of less critical concern where sustainability is not an issue.
5. The increased cooperation of the parties participating in the
acquisition of spares is required. Adversarial relationships between the
Government and its vendors persist, as do poor working relationships and ill
feelings between the separate Services, the Services and DLA, and even
between competing layers of most organizations. A renewed, and in some cases
an introduction of, cooperative effort among all these agencies is required. In our
environment of diminishing resources it is to the advantage of all to forge
relationships based on trust and the achievement of common goals.
6. The procurement environment offers many unique challenges in
the acquisition of spare parts. Having an understanding of the procurement
process and an understanding of the environmental limits within which the
process must function are fundamental requirements for maintaining spares
availability. The process, over time, has become so cumbersome and dynamic
that only the proactive acquisition professional can maintain currency in all
relevant issues.
7. Resources drive the train. If nothing else is apparent from this
research, this fact most certainly is. Regardless of need, current policy or
influence, spares nonavailability is largely governed by the resources allocated
for the procurement. Congress' power to manipulate the appropriation of funds is
a powerful political tool, often used in direct opposition to the stated military need
(e.g., V-22 program).
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8. The only thing certain is uncertainty. This statement is very
appropriate for the area of spares procurement and sustainment. Regardless of
the degree and -quality of planning, it is impractical, if not impossible, to plan for
all the possible contingencies or eventualities. The prudent thing to strive for, in
a resource constrained environment, is the aversion of crisis management
through proactive risk management. Risk management can take a variety of
forms such as the selection of contract type, use of component breakout, and
thorough Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning. Risk management is an
iterative process.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Implement the pre-nonavailability and post nonavailability actions
described in Chapter IV, Sections B and C. These actions were developed to
facilitate the resolution of the impediments to spares availability identified during
research. While not all inclusive, they serve as a guide to the selection of
courses of action available to combat the occurrence of spares nonavailability.
Actions necessary will vary with the circumstances surrounding individual
nonavailability issues. Potential pre-nonavailability and post nonavailability
actions identified in Chapter IV are summarized, in list form, below.
1. Pre-nonavailability actions.
a. Proper Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning.
b. The use of the Spare Acquisition Integrated with Production
program.
c. The use of standard parts.
d. The use of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS).
e. The breakout of spares.
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f. The use of best value contracting.
g. The minimization of contractual changes.
h. The use of cost-reimbursement type contracts to incentivize
contractors to produce a product that matches requirements.
i. The use of organizations such as the Navy Price Fighters to
investigate areas of suspect pricing.
Post Nonavailability actions.
a. The use of prequalified sources of supply.
b. The use of the Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP)
program.
c. The use of life-of-type- buys.
d. The use of continuous risk management throughout a programs
life cycle.
e. Make or buy analysis.
f. The use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to accelerate the
reacquisition process.
2. The relaxation or modification of the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA). Some relaxation or modification of CICA is required to allow the
protection of critical industries and producers of critical components. This would
help develop a viable defense industrial base at a time when it is in serious
jeopardy. This would also allow the more complete realization of the benefits of
continuous process/product improvement derived from habitual working
relationships.
3. Adopt Total Quality Management (TQM) principles. The
Government and its industrial partners should adopt those principles of TQM
which can be applied to the procurement of spares. Those which fit within the
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scope of current governing regulations should be incrementally applied to
achieve continuous process improvement. Examples of proactive measures
include the shoring up of critical technologies by developing long term
relationships with critical industries, investments in Flexible Manufacturing
Systems (FMS), implementation of TQM to the procurement process (e.g.,
process control) and similar initiatives.
C. SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Answers to both primary and subsidiary research questions are provided as
follows:
Primary Research Question. What are the primary impediments to the
acquisition of Army rotary wing aircraft spare parts in the current DOD
acquisition process?
1. Pre-nonavailability impediments.
a. Poorly structured contracts (e.g., lack of appropriate clauses).
b. Inadequate Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning.
c. Faulted source selection process.
d. Faulty specifications.
e. Inadequate training of the acquisition workforce.
f. Lack of coordination within the DOD and the Services.
g. Funding shortfalls.
h. Improper disposition of tooling.
i. Lack of Technical Data Packages (TDPs) and or inadequate
updating.
j. General factors shaping the acquisition environment.
k. Politics.
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I. An acquisition process that is cumbersome/not user friendly.
2. Post nonavailability impediments.
a. Inaccurate demand histories.





g. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support,
h. DLA consumable item transfer.
i. Lack of quality assurance at the vendor level.
j. Sole sourcing.
k. Vendors going into bankruptcy.
I. Mixed Service spares requirements.
m. Small business (SB) and Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB)
performance.
n. Economic infeasibility of supporting older systems.
This list is not all inclusive and only addresses those significant impediments
identified during the research.
Due to the complexity of the acquisition process, the opportunity for difficulty
in maintaining spares availability presents itself frequently, as illustrated by the
above lists. Chapters II and III explored this process and presented/analyzed
impediments to the acquisition of spares. This was accomplished by discussing
the factors currently shaping the procurement environment, discussing
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information obtained using a variety of research methods, and analyzing five
separate component cases.
Subsidiary- Research Question #1. Which impediments are pre-
nonavailability and which impediments are post nonavailability issues?
These were identified, by category, in response to the primary research
question. These were also discussed in detail in Chapter IV, Section A.
Subsidiary Research Question #2. Which impediments are controllable
by the Government and which are controllable by its contractors?
The pre-nonavailability factors identified in the primary research question are
all controllable by the Government. Pre-nonavailability was defined, for the
purpose of this research, to be the time period up to, but not including, contract
award. As defined, the Government has the responsibility of adequately
addressing these issues. Proper ILS planning will ensure that the vast majority of
these pre-nonavailability impediments are never given the opportunity to occur.
Post nonavailability impediments can be controllable by the Government, its
contractors, or both. Post nonavailability was defined, for the purposes of this
research, to be the time period after contract award. Post nonavailability
impediments A, F, H, and I, identified in the primary research question, are
controllable by the Government. Impediments B, C, G, and J, are controllable by
the Government's contractors and impediments D, E, and K, are controllable by
both. While specific responsibility for the resolution of these issues has been
placed, it is not unusual for ail participants in the acquisition process to have an
influence over the impact of these impediments. Carefully orchestrated
cooperation among participants will preclude the occurrence of most
impediments.
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Subsidiary Research Question #3. Are there types of components, within
aviation commodity areas, which traditionally experience a higher degree
of nonavailability than other components, and if so what are their
characteristics?
The research did not result in the identification of homogenous groups of
components as originally intended. Experts questioned were unable to
accurately identify component groupings but did provide information that allowed
the researcher to identify the salient features (characteristics) of nonavailable




2. Lack of design stability.
3. Lack on interoperability and commonality.
4. Long lead times.
5. Finite life criteria.
6. Time in the inventory/level of technology.
It is not necessary for nonavailable components to possess all of these
characteristics but most of those identified during the research usually possessed
two or three of those described above.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As a result of the level of research conducted on the identification of
impediments to the availability of spares, three areas warrant further research.
These subject areas are:
1. The further identification and definition of the salient characteristics of
nonavailable components to provide a proactive tool with which to manage
spares sustainability.
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2. The exploration of supportability requirements for major systems to
determine the point at which a system is upgraded and/or retired due to
the economic infeasibility of further support. The focus could be to the
development of a model assessing critical system criteria (e.g., cost
drivers).
"
3. To explore the possibility of relaxing or modifying the current CICA
requirements for competition to allow habitual buyer-seller relationships for
identified critical systems/components. This would be done in support of




Spare Parts Obsolescence - Questionnaire
Instructions: Please answer all questions, 1 through 21 , to the best of your ability. If you are
unable to answer a question please indicate why (e.g. this question does not
relate to my current position). If necessary, feel free to use the back of the
questionnaire or additional paper to answer the questions if the space provided
is not adequate.
Definition: Spare Parts Obsolescence - Component obsolescence is a problem which affects
the continuity of readiness of an item or system. This lack of continuity can occur due
to such things as contract closeouts, manufacturers going out of business or the
introduction of new technology. Obsolescence occurs when the item is no longer
available or is no longer suited to its original use.









Are obsolete spare parts a problem for your activity and if so, how frequently do they
occur?
yes no
weekly monthly quarterly annually other (specify).
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2. Can obsolete parts be identified prior to their need and if so, how? yes no
a.
3. Do you proactively try to identify obsolete spare parts? yes no
If not, why (e.g. current work load)?
4. Is it economically feasible to proactively search for obsolete spare parts?
yes no . Briefly explain your response.




6. What are the reasons spare parts requisitions can not be filled?
a.
7. What type(s) of spare parts usually turn out to be obsolete?
c.
8. What are the regulations and/or policies which hamper the filling of obsolete spare parts
requirements?
9. What is a typical scenario under which spares procurement problems surface? Briefly
explain.
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10. Why do you think spare parts become obsolete (e.g. lack of demand history)?
1 1
.
Have obsolete spare parts groupings been identified? yes no
If so, what are they?
b.
c.
Are they homogeneous or unrelated?
12. Do you have set procedures, in place, for acquiring obsolete spare parts once they have
been identified? yes no .
If so, what are they?
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13. Are you aware of other methods of filling obsolete spare parts requisitions used by other
agencies / Services? yes no .
If so, what are they?
a.
b.
1 4. How do obsolete spare parts affect your ability to conduct and complete your duties in
your current position? Briefly explain.
15. From your experience, how long does it take to find or develop a source for obsolete parts,
or if not applicable to your position, how long does it normally take for the obsolescence issue
to be resolved by other agencies, to your satisfaction?
1 week or less 4 - 6 months other (specify)
1-4 week 7-11 months
1 - 3 months 1 - 2 years
16. Who do you think should fix the problem of spare parts obsolescence? Briefly explain.
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17. In your opinion, what could be done to prevent spare parts from becoming obsolete?
a.
18. With the current environment (political, economic/budget, defined threat) do you see service
life extensions being a possibility for the existing aircraft fleet?
yes no . Briefly explain your response.
19. What contracting methods do you see as useful for obtaining obsolete spare parts (e.g.
commercial equivalent, contract spares options, foreign sourcing)?
a.
b.
20. With the current environment (political, economic/budget.defined threat) do you see the
problem of spare parts obsolescence increasing?
yes no . Briefly explain your response.
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21 . Are there any additional questions which you can think of which might prove useful to this




ATCOM AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND
BEA BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT
CASL COMPETITION ADVOCATES SHOPPING LIST
CCAD CORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT
CICA COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT
CIM COMPUTER INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING
CIT CONSUMABLE ITEM TRANSFER
CO CONTRACTING OFFICER
DOD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOF DEPOT OVERHAUL FACTOR
DLA DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
DLSIE DEFENSE LOGISTICS STUDIES INFORMATION EXCHANGE
DMR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REVIEW
DMRD DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REVIEW DECISION
DTIC DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER
ECP ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL
EDI ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
EOQ ECONOMICAL ORDER QUANTITY
FAR FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
FAT FIRST ARTICLE TEST
FMS FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
GAO GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
ILS INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
JIT JUST IN TIME
MSDP MILESTONE DECISION POINT
NAC NAVAL ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER
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NADEP NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT
NICP NATIONAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINT
NMCS NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY
NSN NATIONAL STOCK NUMBER
NSY NAVAL SHIPYARD
NTE NOT TO EXCEED
OEM ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER
OPTEMPO OPERATIONAL TEMPO
PALT PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME
PEO PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PM PRODUCT MANAGER
PROJECT MANAGER
PMR PROVISIONING MASTER RECORD
POD PARTS ON DEMAND
RAMP RAPID ACQUISITION OF MANUFACTURED PARTS
R&D RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
RD&A RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
SAIP SPARES ACQUISITION INTEGRATED WITH PRODUCTION
SB SMALL BUSINESS
SDB SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS
SOF SAFETY OF FLIGHT
SPR SPECIAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
SPRINT SPARE PARTS REVIEW INITIATIVES
SSA SOURCE SELECTION AUTHORITY
TDP TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
TQM TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
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APPENDIX C
The Army's reform program began in April 1983, in conjunction with their
planning for the implementation of the Breakout Program (Defense Acquisition
Regulation No. 6). As a result, the Army issued initiatives for the refocusing of
acquisition processes in respect to spare parts. These were known as the









Give spare parts necessary attention.
Ensure that prices paid are fair and reasonable.
Implement DAR Supplement No. 6 "Breakout". 1
Eliminate disincentives on industry to breakout.
Optimize use of standard military parts.
Use value engineering to investigate prices.
Acquire reprocurement (Data) restriction free.
Automate data repositories.
1 Refer to Appendix E
,




Telephonic interviews : (alphabetical order).
1. Mr. Bill Ebeler, Defense Logistics Representative(DLA) at Aviation and Troop
Command (ATCOM).
Question : What has caused the shift in consumables responsibility from the
separate Services to DLA?
Answer : Procurement costs were thought to be too high with several activities
purchasing like items. Maintaining consumables at one location would reduce cost
and improve oversight (more like a business system).
Question : How will DLA handle special requirements for the Services?
Answer : Through the use of Special Program Requirements (SPRs). This is for
abnormal parts usage. It identifies what is needed and when, in the context of special
requirements (e.g., low demand, cyclical usage). The SPR program is characterized
as: buying in anticipation, out on a limb stocking. If the Services do not request an
item once it is stocked, DLA is left "holding the bag". This is a significant problem
area for DLA. Neither agency is responsible to the other (no adverse actions for not
supporting the program from either side, no or few mechanisms to "punish" for
abuses to the system).
2. Mr. Ray Heim, DLA, Aviation Technician.
Question : What are some major issues which result in spares nonavailability
and/or obsolescence?
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Answer(s) : Tooling is a major issue. For older systems like the F-4, the storage
and disposal of tooling by contractors and the Government poses problems.
Maintaining tooling becomes increasingly difficult as the system ages. Replacing
damaged, destroyed or misplaced tooling is difficult at best.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is very problematic. Examples are the F-86 (sabre
jet) and the TA-4 which are both 1950s technology. FMS countries frequently switch
out original components (e.g., engines) making it all the more difficult to support.
Ordering in uneconomical order quantities is another major problem. Finding
sources of supply at a reasonable cost is next to impossible.
Technical Data Packages (TDPs). Prime contractors are reluctant to release data
to the Government without some type of consideration (cost). Older contracts do not
necessarily have provisions for the acquisition of such data. Primes use programs
like "rights guard" to sell usage to the Government for a number of years. Also when
a prime goes out of business or discontinues production (e.g., Fairchild, producer of
the A-10 Thunderbolt) and another company buys the rights to the airframe,
problems generally arise in regard to the future release and updating of technical
data.
To be completely fair, the Services also do many smart things. An example is
the Air Forces' C-5. In this situation, the Service contracted for a 10 year supply of
high use items (e.g., belly landing crash kits). This kit is a complete component
replacement kit for the repair of an airframe damaged after a no gear down landing.
The kit is preconfigured and purchased at a reduced, package price.
3. Mr. Jerry Johnson, ATCOM, Engineer.
Question : What is your opinion on the usefulness of best value and how do you
feel it can best be applied?
Answer : Best value is a proven method of acquiring components. From an
engineering standpoint it makes a lot of sense. Best value can be very beneficial.
The problem, however, can arise when 100% of a requirement is placed with a
selected best value contractor and he/she fails First Article Test (FAT). An
application of best value could be arranged in which the procurement could be
broken out to a proven producer and an identified best value contractor (50-50%).
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This would minimize the chances of shortfalls in sustainment. Where best value
failures hurt the most is in the long lead time items like forgings which can take 18-24
months to acquire. Failure at FAT is devastating to sustainability.
4. Mr. Cal Kalkins, ATCOM, Aircraft Systems Division, Administrative Section.
Question : What forced the Services and DLA to start transferring consumable
item responsibility?
Answer : Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 926 relates to
Consumable Item Transfer (CIT). Transfers are occurring at a rate of 1000 items a
month (ATCOM), until complete. Items are selected for transfer on a specific date.
On that date a paper transfer occurs, reestablishing responsibility from ATCOM to
DLA. All consumables are transferred except non depot repairable, design unstable
and Safety of Flight (SOF) items.
5. Mr. Don Love, DLA, Policy Branch.
Question : How does DLA determine its stockage requirements?
Answer : It does so by criticality or demand criteria per time period. Some
stockage is based on commercial availability but very little falls into this category. A
lot of items are direct vendor deliverable, lead time away. A large number of stocked
items have short lead times.
Question : Does DLA stock prior to demand?
Answer : Prior to DMRD 926, approximately one-half of managed items were
stocked. Now, afterwards, about ninety-eight percent of low demand consumables
are stocked. This stockage increase is hard to sustain with current hiring freezes,
personnel drawdowns and funding reductions. Funding drives the train when it
comes to stocking consumables. Funding levels do not always support what
demand history dictates. Reduced budgets and increased requirements do not
equate to full support.
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6. Mr. George Maisenhelder, ATCOM, Material Management, UH-1 Coordinator.
Question : Can you describe several reasons for spares nonavailability?
Answer(s) : There are a number of reasons for its occurrence. Budgets focusing
on newer procurements, politics in the workplace (not always in sync with
regulations and policies), lack of quality assurance at the vendor level (poor
oversight of processes leading to unacceptable products) and use of sole source
procurements (effects of a sole source going out of business must be considered).
Question : What is the impact of nonavailability?
Answer : The greatest impact is seen in unit mission readiness. It all boils down
to supporting the units out in the field.
Question : What is your opinion regarding DLA taking over responsibility for
consumables?
Answer : The concern is that DLA will not be able to support the fleet. A large
shift in responsibility has occurred but the body of developed knowledge on the
Huey has not shifted. There appears to be a tremendous learning curve involved
with this realigned responsibility.
Question : How frequently does nonavailability occur?
Answer : This is a constant crisis management challenge. Unforeseen
circumstances cause the majority of difficulties. It is rarely a question of can it be
fixed. The question is how long will it take to fix. A lot of unforeseen requirements
work into long lead time fixes.
7. LTC Lee McMillen, Procurement Staff Officer, OASA (RD&A), U.S. Army
Contracting Support Agency.
Question : What are some of the causes of spares nonavailability?
Answer(s) : Clear specifications and access to current, accurate, and complete
Technical Data Packages (TDPs). If either of these two areas is not managed
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properly, significant problems arise as a result. An example is the area of tooling for
out-of-production items.
Personnel cuts-impact on the ability of all responsible agencies to effectively and
efficiently conduct business.
DLA responsibility for consumables items management is another concern.
Some factors causing reductions in stockage levels are reductions in funding levels
and a push towards the Just in Time (JIT) inventory system. The JIT system has lots
of bugs to work out before its benefits can be fully realized. GAO audits also sight
procurements of items which were not done using economical order quantities,
however, funding in some cases does not allow this to occur, or agencies do not
cooperate in accurately determining their needs.
Difficulty with the breakout of spares is another cause. Prime contractors claim
technical data are proprietary and frequently want to provide all the spares required
if capacity/facilities allow them to do so. They are frequently reluctant to lose any
competitive edge in this area.
Lack of updated technical drawings. This is frequently a failure to procure them
and/or the rights to any future updates, or if procured, then a failure to follow through
on receipt.
Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) on long lead time components is
a serious concern. The acquisition process is cumbersome and not always
responsive (e.g., expeditious).
Subcontractors who want to produce spares are not allowed to do so due to the
proprietary nature of the work. This generates adversarial relations between
competitive parties.
8. Mrs. Carol Morris, DLA, Deputy for Consumable Item Transfer.
Question : ATCOM has addressed a concern that DLA may have difficulty
providing adequate consumable item support for its programs. Do you think this is a
viable concern?
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Answer : While concerns do exist, with all parties involved, we (DLA) are not
concerned to the extent that the Services are. We understand their concern and are
taking steps to ensure adequate support. DLA has a vast amount of experience in
consumable item support. The mission has not changed, to any great extent, but the
level of support has.
9. Unnamed source, ATCOM, name(s) withheld due to the nature of the responses
given.
Question : How do you, in contracting, respond to spares obsolescence issues?
Answer : We do nothing. We are the "tail on the dog". We do what we are told to
do. We (ATCOM) are not in the business of dealing in obsolete items. One
respondent stated that "if we have to have it, we go to the OEM, or whoever, and pay
whatever it costs to get it".
Personal interviews : (grouped by office). The following interviews were all
conducted at the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM), St Louis,
Missouri. These interviews, five in all, were found to be the most beneficial
interviews accomplished. They addressed a variety of issues pertinent to spares
availability.
1. COL Green, ATCOM, Blackhawk Project Manager and Mr. Chris Redd, ATCOM,
Blackhawk Project Managers Office, Logistics Manager.
Question : What are the top two issues facing your office today that materially
affect your ability to maintain spare parts availability?
Answer(s) : The two top issues are DLA procurement policy and the economic
feasibility of sustainment. First, the DLA issue arose from the recommendations from
the Defense Management Review (DMR). As such, DLA has assumed responsibility
for spare parts sustainment. The concern here rests with differing requisition and
stockage policies. The differences that currently exist are such that sustainment of
the fleet may become an issue. There is little doubt that DLA is a competent agency,
but the magnitude of this shift in responsibility is enormous. Without careful
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coordination and collaboration on this issue, sustainability will be affected. Second,
the issue of the economic feasibility of sustainment is an issue for all fielded systems.
The Huey is reaching a point in its life cycle where cost effective sustainment could
become an issue. ^At some point in time the cost of sustainment is such that further
operational use of the system is questioned. Support cost is generally driven up by
the nonavailability of spares, the sheer cost of maintenance per flight hour and other
considerations involving the support of obsolete or near obsolete technology.
Supporting systems which have been fielded for several decades can be a very
difficult task. The trick is to recognize this time will come for any system and to
manage the program so that these effects are minimized.
Modernization of platforms and reengineering can reduce the long term costs of
sustainment by introducing newer technology into an older system. However, at
some point in time, these possible solutions also become economically not feasible
to pursue. It is a fair assessment to equate length of time in the inventory with
increased support costs. For example, the cost of supporting one blade hour for a
Huey is rapidly approaching and will pass the cost of supporting one blade hour for a
Blackhawk. When this occurs, and is sustained over time, an assessment will be
required to analyze options to either reduce support costs or retire the less cost
effective system. 1
2. LTC Terrance Reininger, ATCOM, UH-1 Product Manager.
Question : In addition to the five component cases you provided for analysis,
what other significant issues pose sustainment problems for the Huey?
Answer : The greatest problem involves the issue of the qualification and
maintenance of a viable vendor base for the procurement of spares outside the OEM.
The concern is that the process of qualifying vendors, particularly under the concept
of best value, does not have adequate oversight. Too many vendors who are
qualified as sources and awarded contracts, fail First Article Test (FAT). The affect of
such failures equates to possible breaks in sustainability if current on-hand stocks
are not sufficient to support the fleet through issue resolution. This has been a
recurring problem with many Project/Product Offices.
3. Mr. Steve Monaco, ATCOM, UH-1 Product Managers Office, Aero Engineer.
1 Various estimates were given for the completion of the Huey phase out. Most experts
questioned gave general estimates around the year 2005-2010.
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Question : Same as 2 above.
Answer(s) : Best value is not attaining its goals. Breakout engineers determine
who is qualified, from a technical standpoint, to produce a give component. Each
component is coded and a Technical Data Package is developed. The problem
arises when a component is difficult to manufacture (highly technical, state of the art)
and is a critical component. This combination offers the opportunity for great difficulty
in sustainment. The manufacture of critical components is restricted to approved
sources. These approved sources, prior to becoming such, are screened for access
on a bidders list, Once on this list, they have access to the Competition Advocates
Shopping List (CASL), a list of components which are purchased for a system.
The problem with source qualification is that the resources are not available to
adequately oversee and evaluate a vendor's technical capability. Due to this lack of
oversight, the following areas can remain in question: manufacturing capability,
facility availability, existence and implementation of quality programs, the detailed
process of production and First Article Test (e.g., ability to pass).
As noted previously by LTC Reininger, the failure to pass FAT is the wrong time
to discover that a manufacturer can not perform. Past experience has shown that
efforts to fix FAT shortfalls are usually long lead time fixes. The effects of which are,
slipped delivery schedules, increased cost (depending on contract type), grounded
aircraft, delayed maintenance, and degraded unit mission readiness.
Other problem areas involve vendors, who for a myriad of reasons, go into
bankruptcy. At the time of this research, a major source of supply for Huey
components, handling 15-20 separate contracts, filed for chapter 11 protection. This
places the fulfillment of these contracts in serious jeopardy and in most cases
freezes them for a time until the issue can be properly addressed. If the vendor
closes his doors and the contracts as terminated for convenience or default, the
process of identifying, qualifying, and awarding a contract to an alternate source of
supply begins. Keep in mind that this is an administratively long process.
Lastly, the requirement for fatigue testing is a hot issue. Applicable law requires
that all fatigue testing must be conducted using the same processes as the OEM.
The problem here is cost and finding a facility that has the ability to duplicate the
OEM's processes. This was specifically addressed in chapter III, section C,
component case analysis, page 34.
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4. Mr. George Maisenhelder, ATCOM, Material Management, UH-1 coordinator.
Question : What is the status of the phase out of the Huey?
Answer : There are approximately 3000 aircraft in the inventory today (1992).
We are in the process of phasing out the older aircraft first, at a rate of roughly 200-
300 per year. By the year 2000, approximately 1200 (+/-) aircraft will remain. These
phase outs, to a large extent, go to other agencies. ATCOM and DLA still support
these systems, which equates to little actual reduction in support, just a change in
who the customer is.
Question : Is spares nonavailability a current issue?
Answer : Yes, there are always issues which develop that lead to breaks in
availability or increased demand. Sometimes the supply system can support these
shifts in requirements and sometimes it can not.
Question : What are some of these causes of nonavailability?
Answer(s) : Changing climatic conditions or a need to operate in an unfamiliar
environment (e.g., Desert Shield/Storm).
Obsolete parts. The provisioning process replaces old with new as quickly as
possible. Sometimes there is an easily identified replacement item but more
frequently the solution is not that simplistic.
Modifications such as the change of the Huey's lubrication system from oil to
grease. The oil lubrication system is now obsolete, yet not all DOD agencies and/or
FMS customers changed to the new system. Items that are coded obsolete (PZ) are
dropped out of the material management system. The problem arises when an
agency still using an older system has a requirement for a component to support the
use of that system. This is not a rare occurrence.
Mixed requirements are another issue. The lubrication system, illustrated above
is also an example of a mixed requirement as well as a modification. Another
example is the Army's use of a hub spring for the Huey's main rotor head. The other
Services have elected not to use it but it must be stocked for the Army (increasing
support requirement).
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Redefining an item's inspection criteria to include a finite life status, when it
originally did not. This can drastically increase the demand for an item and easily
overwhelm the supply system until demand can be matched through procurement.
Supporting systems no longer actively stocked in the inventory (e.g., UH-iM,
operated by El Salvador (20 each) and by Redstone Arsenal as drones). ATCOM
and DLA will support these until current stock is exhausted, at which point the user
assumes responsibility for the systems support. ATCOM normally gives 2 to 3 years
notice to users of obsolete or no longer stocked items.
Manufacturers (sole source) that serve notice to the Government of their intent to
discontinue the manufacture, or that obsolete an item. Breakout engineers must
qualify another source to meet any further requirement that must be met. Make or
buy decisions are also analyzed at this point.
The quality of Small Business (SB) and Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB)
products are a recurring concern. Experience has shown this to be a problem area,
particularly when the vendor is sole source. This area of concern was specifically
addressed in chapter III, section C, component case analysis, page 39.
Unforeseen demand which exceeds the safety stock level. This can happen as a
result of a number of circumstances. The safety level can easily be exceeded, as
some items have a level set at zero. Long lead time, as a general rule, is required to






Are obsolete spare parts a problem for your activity and if so, how frequently do
they occur?
a. Both agreed that it was a problem.
b. Frequency of occurrence ranged from weekly to monthly.
2. Can obsolete parts be identified prior to their need and if so, how?
a. Yes they can be identified prior to their need (occurrence).
b. By procuring sustaining effort for the Provisioning Master Record (PMR).
This amounts to the updating of data and notification of obsolete parts and
their replacements from the OEM.
c. Tracking demand history.
d. Trend analysis.
e. Surveys of end users and other agencies.
f. Proactive management from the owning service.
3. Do you proactively try to identify obsolete spare parts?
a. Both respondents answered this questions yes.
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4. Is it economically feasible to proactively search for obsolete spare parts?
a. One respondent misread the question and answered no. The other
respondent answered yes.
b. The rational behind the yes response was that cost is not the driver behind
this effort. The actual driver is readiness. If cost is found to be unreasonable,
then the actual need for the system needs to be questioned and its use
reevaluated.
5. What are the reasons obsolete spare parts can not be identified prior to their
need?
a. Low or no demand for the item in question. When the need does arise, in
a lot of cases, the fact that the item is now obsolete has not been
disseminated to those who have a need to know.
b. Lack of data. Data on such issues as usage, stockage, engineering are
not available or not provided to those who need the data.
c. Resource constraints (e.g., personnel, funding, and apathy.
6. What are the reasons spare parts requisitions can not be filled?
a. National Inventory Control Points (NICP) do not have the stocks on-hand
to issue.
b. Out of production (OEM or its subcontractors) - no steady demand to make
it profitable or practical to maintain production capability.
c. Do not order in economical order quantities (EOQ).
d. Serious conflicts between sound supply management and sound
business / contracting practices, (e.g., GAO writes adverse reports about
depot excess and in response the budgeteers cut funding, resulting in an
inability to procure 100% of what demand history supports).
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7. What type(s) of spare parts usually turn out to be obsolete?
a. Out of production weapon systems.
b. Weapon systems with long service lives.
c. Weapon systems which are constantly upgraded or modernized.
d. Items or spares which are technologically inferior.
e. Unforecast safety issues.
f. Item is no longer suited for its original use. This may be a result of better
manufacturing processes, better technology or the fact that quality, safety or
useful life of the part was not as good as planned.
8. What are the regulations and/or policies which hamper the filling of obsolete
spare parts requirements?
a. From industry - none, to the OEM.
b. Same as 6c and 6d, above.
9. What is a typical scenario under which spares procurement problems surface?
Briefly explain.
a. From industry - anytime the Government orders an obsolete spare part,
the Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) causes serious problems.
The acquisition time for these parts is historically longer than desired.
b. When a major system goes out of production, the number of suppliers
(prime and its subcontractors) slowly decreases, over time, until few if any
remain to fill requirements.
10. Why do you think spare parts become obsolete (e.g. lack of demand history)?
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a. lack of demand history.
b. low or no demand history.
c. Poor management, personnel cuts, little or no automation, limited
automation interface with other activities, data exchange difficulties between
users - item managers, engineers, etc.
d. Same as 7f, above.
1 1
.
Have obsolete spare parts groupings been identified? Are they homogeneous or
unrelated?
a. One respondent said no.
b. The other respondent said it was "real tough" to handle due to the number
of fielded systems and possible multiple uses of NSNs. An effort is made to
track items which are being phased out, to minimize unforecast problems
with the remaining fleet. Homogenous groupings have not been identified.
12. Do you have set procedures, in place, for acquiring obsolete spare parts once
they have been identified?
a. Both respondents said yes.
b. From industry - Advise the Government that the required part is obsolete.
If they still require the part and fit and function remain, the part will be
provided, lead time away.
c. Potential sources lists by commodity (e.g., Lockheed).
d. Attempts to procure one time buys of the production spares being
disposed of by the OEM.
e. If no commercial source exists, check DOD maintenance depots.
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f. Long term response - send a request to "special" factories set up to do
spares. The shear volume of spares makes deciding what they will be set up
to produce a difficult question. They can be a big help for select areas but
are not the panacea to fix the big spares production problems.
13. Are you aware of other methods of filling obsolete spare parts requisitions used
by other agencies / Services?
a. Industry responded with no.
b. Restriction on the procurement of spares to the OEM.
c. Restriction of procurement to limited sources.
d. Service depot fabrication.
14. How do obsolete spare parts affect your ability to conduct and complete your
duties in your current position? Briefly explain.
a. PALT grows and requisitions are not filled. There is not single solution as
each problem requires its own unique solution. PR's back up and
management issues grow.
b. Industry - It is necessary to make some parts obsolete as we continuously
strive to furnish a better quality part that performs better to reduce operator
cost. This in turn causes various problems with contracts.
15. From your experience, how long does it take to find or develop a source for
obsolete parts, or if not applicable to your position, how long does it normally take for
the obsolescence issue to be resolved by other agencies, to your satisfaction?
a. 6 months to a year.
b. 7 to 1 1 months on average, some take years.
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16. Who do you think should fix the problem of spare parts obsolescence? Briefly
explain.
a. Government response - All of us. Don't hide from the problem or pass the
buck.
b. Get control of the data and make it accessible.
c. Recognize that spares equate to readiness.
d. Government, through the acquisition of data for the Provisioning Master
Record (PMR). The government generally does not elect to do this.
17. In your opinion, what could be done to prevent spare parts from becoming
obsolete?
a. Only incorporate technological advances when they are necessary.
Change will always obsolete some parts.
b. Accurate and timely receipt, filing/storage, and dissemination of technical
data (e.g., drawings, revisions, instructions).
c. Accurate data base of technical data, requirements data and stockage.
d. A comprehensive and automated system to share knowledge between all
parties ( e.g., Army, Navy, DLA). Information exchange is a real bottleneck.
As an example: ATCOM is the system owner, DLA is the NICP and procuring
agency, the Navy in Philadelphia has the technical repository and the OEM
has multiple plants and produces or did produce multiple systems, most of
which are out of production (e.g., UH-1H, OH-58A, AH-1).
18. With the current environment (political, economic/budget, defined threat) do you
see service life extensions being a possibility for the existing aircraft fleet?
a. Industry - No, environmental conditions should never be reasons to
increase risk or reduce safety to the operator.
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b. One respondent answered yes. This has a good and a bad side. Good -
reliable systems are retained. Bad - spares become more difficult to acquire.
Old technology keeps getting older.
19. What contracting methods do you see as useful for obtaining obsolete spare
parts (e.g. commercial equivalent, contract spares options, foreign sourcing)?
a. The above options are good, but not if demand is low. Manufacturers
don't like to make commitments and then not have the Government follow
through (e.g., not order the number of parts forecast, termination for
convenience).
b. Presolicitation notices, preapproved producer.
c. Industry - always deal with the OEM.
20. With the current environment (political, economic/budget, defined threat) do you
see the problem of spare parts obsolescence increasing?
a. Industry - no. The Government is buying and stocking lower quantities of
parts and intends to eventually force this (lower demand) on to the OEM.
b. One respondent answered yes. GAO and Congressional pressure to
reduce Depot stocks, reduce buys (e.g., buys at 70% of demand), increased
pressure regarding unreasonable prices will increase the occurrence of
obsolescence.
21. Are there any additional questions which you can think of which might prove
useful to this research? If so, what are they ?
a. Tooling is another thorn, maybe worthy of another paper.
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